0 - The Black Vault

THE BDM CORPORATION
The introduction of US
combat forces into Vietnam and the concurrent
infusion of heavy US combat support equipment had an appreciable
impact on the Soviet Union's strategic perspective on Vietnam. Until 1965,
Moscow viewed its involvement in the conflict as an acceptable and manageable
risk, particularly in 1964 when it app.ared Hanoi's objectives would
shortly reach fruition. By mid-1965, however, the issue came to rest on
avoiding a direct military confrontation with the United States, while
still maintaining previously articulated objectives. (See Figure 1-3 -
"PRC
and USSR O'rjectives in the Emerging Tri-polar World and Vietnam."14/)
It was at this juncture in the conflict, when Hanoi's heavy materiel
requirements increased in its efforts to counter US military power, that
Soviet objectives came into cross-conflict. Hence, the Soviet leadership
was faced with carefully balancing these contradictions, particularly as it
entered a period of rplaxed tensions with the US.
4. Objectives and Strategies of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
in Review
Like the Soviet Union,
Communist China also had an ideological
motivation for assisting Hanoi in its war effort, particularly as the
nature of the Vietnam conflict reflected, to a certain degree, the protracted
revolutionary struggle earlier undertaken by the Peking regir.,e.15/
But the Chinese involvement in Southeast Asia was also stimulated by other,
more complex concerns, the majority of which grew directly out of the PRC's
anti-Soviet and anti-American posture, Figure 1-3 summarized PRC and USSR
objectives and strategies in the emerging tri-polar world; from this summary,
it is clear that the two leading communist powers were pursuing a
number of asymmetric objectives.
In the first five years of the period under consideration, Peking
not only viewed its support to Hanoi
as a manageable risk, it also found
hanoi's military needs comensurate with the PRC capacity to fulfill them.
In fact, there was a certain, coincidental compatibility between the
respective supply capabilities of the USSR and the PRC: Moscow concentrated
primarily on Hanoi's heavy materiel needs while Peking contributed
light, primarily small arms weaponry.
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