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THE BDM CORPORATION<br />

other and began to shape a settlement from a seemingly intractable stale-<br />

=7.3 m a t e .<br />

b, A Return to Secret Negotiations<br />

<strong>The</strong> situation in the wir~ter of I?9 was<br />

lookir.i up for the<br />

new administration: there was a lull in the combat, the presdent ha(<br />

taken his case to tne people and the US public responded to the presiGent's<br />

Lall with suostantial support. <strong>The</strong> time appeared ripe for serious negotila-•<br />

[ tions; nowever, the North Vietnamese, who had stalemated the Paris Peace<br />

Talks for over a year, remained as intransigent and obstinate as ever. Mr.<br />

Kissilger, with the President's approval,<br />

thought the time right for secret<br />

negotiations. and through the eff rts of Genera] Vernon Walters, then<br />

Defense Attache in France, secret talxs were arranged in January, 1970.106/<br />

And so Mr. Kissinger began what was to become an almost three-year secret<br />

search for a negotiated settlement to the war. <strong>The</strong> me,,44nrcs "n a small<br />

house situated in the Paris suburbs were attended by f[<br />

an Thuy and<br />

his Special Adviser, Le Duc Tho, nigh ranking D'V Politburo member. Le Duc<br />

Tho, a strict Leninist whose "profession was revolution" and "vocation<br />

guerrilla warfare," ditected the efforts of the DRV<br />

[ tionlO_7/<br />

negotiating delega-<br />

Le Duc Tho considered negotiations as another battlr. His<br />

idea of a negotiWtion was to out forard his unilateral<br />

demands. <strong>The</strong>ir essence was fcr the US to withdraw on a<br />

deadline so short that the collapse of Saigon would be<br />

inevitahle. On the vay ouc we were being asked to dismaitie<br />

an allied government and establish an alternative whose<br />

composition would be prescribed by Hanoi. Any proposition<br />

that -ailed to agree with this he rejected as 'not concrete".108/<br />

During a February, 1970,<br />

secret session, Mr, Kissinger, in a<br />

prepared statement, made the following points to the ORV negotiators-<br />

0 the US was seeking a settlement which would resolve the issues,<br />

once and for all.<br />

• Hanoi's combat position had not improved since the August 1969<br />

meetings<br />

RVN).,<br />

(especially with respect to the balance of fo,'ces in<br />

7-45

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