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0 - The Black Vault

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THE BDM CORPORATION<br />

Reliance upon the Selective Service to meet the growing requirements<br />

of the Armed Forces whlen<br />

large Reserve forces were available drew<br />

critical comments from both Congress and the public. <strong>The</strong> complaint would<br />

have been the same whether the choice had been made by draft board or<br />

lottery, or whether it had been besed on physical, marital or educational<br />

status. <strong>The</strong> crunch was that some were selected and sent .o var while<br />

others were allowea to stay home. As the conflict wore on, the unpooularity<br />

of the war grew among the members<br />

of the draft age group, manifesting<br />

itself in increased antiwar demonstrations,<br />

druft card burnings,<br />

and efforts to avoid military service.<br />

Critical comments on the decision to depend on the draft and not<br />

to mobilize also came from high ranking military. General Harold K.,<br />

John3on, Army Chief of Staff, was concerned about the overall impact on the<br />

Army's worldwide posture. <strong>The</strong> size of the troop commitments to Vietnam and<br />

the tours of only one-year duration were viewed as the biggest problems. Of<br />

all the Chiefs,<br />

he was probably the most insistent on the need for the<br />

Reserves.66/General Johnson argued that:<br />

As General<br />

0 the main problem preventing the call-up of Reserves was the<br />

legacy of the Berlin mobilization in 1961 and the ensuing outcry<br />

of misuse, and,<br />

0 the Reserves represented a wasted asset that was only good when<br />

not called up, and kept primarily for their deterrent value.<br />

Johnson once remarked about the Reserves, we are "feeding the<br />

horse but never taking him out of the barn."67/<br />

draftees.<br />

General Westmoreland, on the other hand, was satisfied with<br />

He expressed his feeling that there never was a point when the<br />

President could have called up the Reserves before Tet in 1968.<br />

Prior to<br />

that watershed battle, the COMUSMACV had been ambivalent about a call-dp of<br />

Reserves, His thoughts were that:<br />

0 a call-up might set loose pressure to disengage from RVN prematurely<br />

in order to get the reservists home,<br />

• after their one year tou.rs in RVN, the reservists would apply<br />

pressure for release from acti\,e duty, which would be disruptive<br />

army-wide. 68/<br />

4-28<br />

and,

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