0 - The Black Vault

THE E£DM CORPORATION
would bt withdrawn ultimately, that the reunification of Vietnam should
come (if that was the desire of Doth ý.,Yth and South) about through direct
negotiations between the Vietnamese, and that (after a settlement) Vietnam
would not contain any foreign bases. As a matter oF fact, the US indicated
[ munist's
that three of the DRV's Four Points were acceptable.82/
Regardless, major
stumbling blocks developed from the US rejection of any internal arrangements
for South Vietnam as settled on the bas's of the NLF program;
Saigon's rejection of a separate political role for the NIF; ana the Com-
contention that the GVN was a puppet regime cf the US. Further
disagreement surfaced iver the statu3 of the DRV's forces in the South;
indeed, Hanoi never admitted that it nad forces in the South.
There are several conclusions that one might draw from
the material developed heretofore with respect to negotiations in this
phase; they are that:
0 the US had no set negotiating strategy
* the US was poorly orqanized for negotiations
* the US lacked imagination in its negotiating efforts
* there was a failure of coordination within the USG with respect
to negotiatiors
. the incompatibility of the US and DRV styles of diplomacy produced
a breaKdown of communication--especially in the preliminary
phas,.s of the negotations.
* the symbolic and incentive (car-ots and sticks) rationales for
bombing backfired (and GVN officials viewed the 1968 bombing halt
as signaling a withdrawal of US spirit, soon to be followed oy a
withdrawal of US forccs)
0 the DRV used negotiations as a means to get the boincing stopped
I the
in 1968
(they needed an end to the bombing because they were
preparing to fight a conventional war, which required long supply
lines free from aerial attack and a secure near base in the North
where supp ies could be marshalled)
DRV carefully played out the negotiations according to the
timing of the US presidential elections.83/
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