0 - The Black Vault

THE BD?,1 CORPORATION
Reserve components battalions and brigades trained and equipped to deploy
as part of those divisions in an emergency requiring mobilization. ,Moreover,
as more of the Army's srength went into the combat structure (the
combat teeth) the entire Army became more dependent upon the capabilities
of Reserve components supporting units (the support tail). That greater
dependence necessitated closer integration and increased concern for the
readiness and mobilization requirement of the Army's Reserve Con-ponents. /l/
C. SUMMARY ANALYSIS AND INSIGHTS
Failure to mobilize during the Vietnam War causod repercussions that
impacted on the US economy, the Congress and executi,2_ branch, the draftage
public, and -- to an extent that cannot yet be measured -- on the military
services.
0 Historically, mobilization connotes a sense of na3ticnal determination
and therefore it provides a strong signal to an enemy;
lack of mobilization conveys a sense of irresolut;nn in circumstances
such as the Vietnam Way'.
* The actual US commitment of combat troops j.:) Indo-J-ina differed
from that foreseen in contingency plans. \ll sa ,y US plans
anticipated a mobilization of Reserve Compoiients. The f-ilure to
call up critically short technical skills, especially logistics
arid engineer units, contributed sicmificantly to delays in the
deployment of combat tr'oops to Vietri.:1,1•.
* The decision not to mobilize but to depend on increased recruitment
and draft calls proved to be the "lesser" of two polt.ical
"evils" for President Johnson. Militarily, the decision proved
less.Zhan effective, and it exacerbated selective service inequities,
morale probl~ms, personnel turbulence and shortages of
qualified leaders an,:, technicians. That decision, among others,
contributed to his political demise.
0 The call-up of the Reserves would not significantly hav3 altered
the final outcome of the war, assuming that the wa- would have
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