0 - The Black Vault

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THE BDM CORPORATION
e to grasp the opportunity -- with all its associated risks -- of
the political instability in South Vietnam to disengage and pull
out.
The first option was rejected by US leadership because of
the belief that the Diem-Nhu government just could not win. The Diem
government was considered to be coup-prone; it would be only a matter of
time before he would fall from power. The third option was never very
seriously considered as a policy alternative because of the assumption that
an independent,
noncommunist South Vietnam was too important a strategic
interest to abandon, and because the situation was not sufficiently drastic
to call into question so basic an assumption.
preferred alternative because:
* South Vietnam was thought to be too important to lose
0 The US wanted to win against the communist insurgency
The second course was the
* The coup-plotting Vietnamese generals seemed to offer the best
prospect of a military victorv%.
The US opted not to prevent a coup.
As a matter of fact the
US decided to support, even encourage the coup. In making this choice the
US deepened its involvement in Vietnamese affairs.
Underlying the prevailing US view that there was no viable
alternative to Diem was the belief that the disruptive effect of a coup on
the war effort, and the disorganization that would follow, could only
benefit the Viet Cong, perhaps decisively. Military estimates and reports
emanating from MACV through the summer of 1963 continued to reflect an
optimistic outlook,
indicating good reason to continue support of Diem,
even in the face of his inept handling of the Buddhist crisis, Actually,
the GVN position in the war had begun to deteriorate seriously. This
weakening was not apparent to US leadership. The then prevailing view held
' that the Buddhist crisis had not yet detracted from the war effort,
although its potential was so recognized.
Secretary of Defense McNamara on
July 19, 1963, told a press conference t:at the war was progressing well
and that the Diem government's problems with the Buddhists had thus far not
affected it. The US intelligence community, however, had already begun to
note depressing effects of the crisis on military and civilian morale.
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