0 - The Black Vault

THE BDM CORPORATION
because of the domestic distress experienced during the call-up of the
Reserves during the Berlin Crisis.
A major debate in Congress would have
created public awareness of the seriousness of the problem in Vietnam and
Mr. Johnson did not want to frighten the American public. A major debate
over US commitments to Vietnam might also have encouraged Hanoi to be more
adventurous. Finally, the president wished to maintain his "guns and
butter" policy --
to protect his "Great Society" programs -- which could
have been jeopardized seriously by a full-scale Reserve Forces call-up.
President Johnson announced on July 28, 1965, his decision
to commit 50,000 additional ground troops to Vietnam.
The Reserves were
not mobilized because he did not think iZ was essential.25/ It was
explained that it would have taken several months to equip the Reserves
once they were called up. Instead the 1st Cavalry Division from CONUS
followed the Okinawa-based 173rd brigade (Airmobile) to Vietnam, and
Imonthly draft calis were increased fromr 17,000 to 35,000.26/ Since the
duration and level of the war could not be estimated, expansion of forces
by an increase in draft quotas afforded a flexibility to change the level
of the US troop commitments depending on the requirements of the war.
The decision not to mobilize the Reserves seems to have been
the President's alone. It appears to have been based more on political
considerations than military.27/
He feared that a call-up of the Reserve
components would have brought the Soviets and Chinese into the war; that
congressional opposition would have threatened his Great Society Programs;
and, that it would have alarmed the public.
Subsequent decisions not to mobilize the Reserves were made
in late 1965, and throughout 1966 and 1967. The Joint Chiefs continued to
advocate a call-up of the Reserves., They contendad that commitments to
NATO
and other areas, as well as General Westmoreland's troop requirements
for Vietnam could not be met without mobilization of the Reserves.
The JCS
also believed that only a massive introduction of troops and firepower
would bring an ena to the war "in the shortest time with the least
cost."23/
General Westmoreland's troop requirements had begun to exceed
the limits of the services unless a call-up of the Reserves was
nstituted.
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