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THI<br />

THE BDM CORPORATION<br />

the future.7/ US joint planning for possible intervention in Indochina<br />

before 1965 fit the pattern of similar US planning for contingencies in<br />

other parts of the woId. <strong>The</strong> JCS issued the Joint Strategic Capabilities<br />

Plan (JSCP) to assign tasks, allocate forces, and provide guidance to<br />

commanders of unified and specified commands.8/ Guidance issued annually<br />

in the JSCP was used by commanders of unified aqd specified commarnds to<br />

develop or revise contingency plans (operation plans, or OPLANs) for areas<br />

of concern in their theaters. (Soe Figure 3-1). After approval by the JCS<br />

of the unified command's plan, detailed supporting plans were developed by<br />

that comaand's component commanders. Concurrently, the military services<br />

determined logistic resupply requirements for each contingency plan 9/ In<br />

the 1950s and early 196Os, the Army component of Pacific Command, US Army,<br />

Pacific (USARPAC), played a major role in contingency planning, since its<br />

commander was the designated joint field commander in each of the contingency<br />

pians for Indoc:,ina.lO/ Wher, U'SMACV was formed as a subordinate<br />

unified command, ite staff planning responsibilities were dire'ctly to<br />

ClNCPAC.<br />

In view of the complexity of the various contingency plars and<br />

the need for extensive coordination, considerable time was required to<br />

complete the planning sequence. In some cases, nine or more wonths were<br />

needed. In another case, the revision cycle for OPLAN 32-64 -- the basic<br />

plan providing for US combat participation in defense of Southeast Asia --<br />

required over 18 months.ll/<br />

2. Objectives<br />

US planners had witnessed encroachment by communist-backed forces<br />

in several parts of the globe, and some believed that ýhe Indochinese<br />

countries would soon be ripe for a communist move. As pointed out in<br />

official documents, three major perceptions dominated US planning and<br />

policymaking on Indochina during this time: the increased importance of -<br />

Asia in world politics; the tendency to view the wooIdwlde communist threat<br />

as a monolith, cent-ally directed frem Moscow; and the view u, Ho Chi<br />

Miri:i's attempts to evict the French as a local manifestation of the worldwide<br />

communist thrust.12/<br />

3-3

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