0 - The Black Vault

THE BDM CORPOPATION
up to active duty selected :iv Nationei Guard, Air Force Reserve
and Navy units as replacements.
of the eignty-two man
The seizure of a US
ship ol the high seas, the imprisonment
crew and the trie' ot those captives as criminals
triggered a flurry of National Security r.-uncil meetings to review o~her
alternative courses of action for the IJ. Among those alternatives considered
and rejected were-.
0 the mining of Wonsan and other North Korear harbors
* the interd ction of North Korea'S coastal shipping lanes
* the seizure nf a Nor~h Korean ship
* the striking of selected North 'orean targets by air and nival
gunfi re.
In each case, LBJ considered the Dotential risks to, greaL and possible
gains tro small; theiifore he opted to back t.e airpower move and partial
mobilization with intense diplomatic efforts to free the captives, it was
a course of action which proved laden with political pitfalls and painfully
time co:suming.
b. Rationale for the Tet Mobilization
On January 31,
1968, eight short days after the Pueblo incident,
the DRV directed their countrywide Tet offensive against South Vietnam.
Although the action had been predicted, Tet took the US command and
the US public by surprise, and its strength, length and int(nsity prolonged
the shock. As the attacks continued the Secretary of Defense requested
that the JCS furnish plans for the emergency reinforcement of MACV. 37/
General Westmoreland's assessment of the situation on
February 12 was as follows:
Since last October, the enemy has launched a major
campaign signaling a char,g of strategy from one of
protracted war to one uf Quizk military/political
victory during the Americar, election year., His first
phase, aesigned to secure the border areas, has failed.
The second phase, launched on the occasion of Tet and
designed to initiate public uprising, to disrupt the
machinery of government and command and control of the
Vietnamese forces, and to isolate the cities, has also
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