0 - The Black Vault

THE BDM CORPORATION
a., NSSt-,-l: Developing Objectives and Searching For a
Strategy
As part of his search for the best strategy to pursue in
Vietnam, Nixon ordered Kissinger to give him all possible alternatives,
Kissinger responded by circulating National Security Study Memorandum
(NSSM)
Number 1, in which he asked various government agencies to give him
their separate views about the conduct of the war and the negotiating
environment. The consensus was that it was time to get out. 86/
to NSSM
In addition, there was general agreement by the respondents
1 that the DRV was in Paris to negotiate for a variety of motives,
but not primarily out of weakness., All USG agencies agreed that it was
unlikely that the DRV had gone to Paris either to accept a face-saving
formula for defeat or to give the US a face-saving way to withdraw. They
concluded that the communists had been subjected to heavy military pressure,
and therefore a desire to end thE losses and costs of the war was an
element in their decision to negotiate.
ooinion that Hanoi believed it could persist long enough to:
Further, there was a concensus
* obtain a favorable negotiated settlement
0 undernine GVN and US relations
* provide a better chance for PAVN victory in the South
0 attain its ultimate goal of a unified Vietnam under communist
control87/
There was sharp debate, however, between and within USG
agencies about the effect or the possible outcome of a Vietnam settlement
on the other Southeast Asian nations.,
A key reference document, National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE) 50-68, which was used to formulate various agency views, tended to
downgrade the once highly regarded "domino cheory." It stated that a
settlement would permit the communists to take over the government of South
* Vietnam, and, though not immediately, would be likely to bring Camboaia and
Laos into the DRV's orbit, but that such developments would not necessarily
unhinge the test of Asia.88/ Notably, the assessments in the NIE were
supported by OSD, Department of Defense and DIA (Defense Intelligence
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