0 - The Black Vault

THE BDM C0RPORATION
itself footing the bill for most of the program costs, was very skeptical
of the OCO working; meanwhile, USIA and CIA both indicated that they would
cotinue to deal directly with their field personnel
through OCO).119/
The decision to turn pa'ification over to COMUSMACV,
rather than work
with a integrated
militarv-civilian chain of command, was announced by newly-assigned
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker on May 11, 1967, The ration~ale for such a move
was given as-,
0 the single-manager concept is the most efficient and effective
means of accomplishing the US role in RVN pacification,
* security is necessary for pacification, and
0 che majority of the securit•, forces available belong to
COMUSMACV.
Bunker stated that the decision to reorganize was entirely his own;
however, clearly the decision had come frcnr the White House and was based
on the unmistakable fact that LBJ "felt the time had come to turn pacificatior,
over -a MACV."120/
Komer was given ambassadorial rank, assigned as Westmorel&nd's deputy
in MACV, and directed to supervise the reorganization oý OCO into what
becana known as the Office of Civil Operation and Revolutionary Development
(CORDS).
To many Americans in Saigon this newly intensified pressure from
Washington 4as considered excessive and several strong voices within the
civilian agencies began predicting problems for the new directorate and its
new deputy director. Komer, a hard-charging, energetic, and self-assured
man, was not Doputlar in the US mission.121/ However, by mid-summer critics
of the CORDS operation were beginning to concede that it was making headway.
122/
One expert wrote:
To his credit Komer did not allow the pettiness of the
Saigon-based bureaucracy to stand in his way. By
skilliful negotiations he reorganized the old OCO
organization, made peace--after a fashion--with the US
military commands, and placed good people in the provinces
[and] applied modern management techniques.
.123/
jI 5-50