0 - The Black Vault

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
(CONTINUED)
Chapte
Page
4 MOBILIZATION 4-1 to 4-38
A. Introduction -I
B., Mobilization of the Reservesf A Difficult
Presidential Decision 4-2
1. Background
2. Mobilization: The Backbone of Early
4-2
Contingency Planning (1954-1961) 4-5
SCrisis:
3. The Bay of Pigs Fiasco and the Berlin
Reason t) Mobilize 4-6
4, Other Crisis Situations '1962-1965) 4-9
5. Consmitme.it to Vietnam:
The US Milita*'y
* 1965 to 196S 4-10
6. Mini-Mobiliz4tion: The Pueblo Incident
and Tet 1bi8
7, Vietnamization and Withdrawal: 1969-1972
4-15
4-24
8. Post-War Impacts: Down to a Zero Draft 4-26
S9. A Lesson Learned 4-30
C. Summary Analysis and Insights 4-31
D. Lessons 4-32
5 PACIFICA T ION AND VIETNAMIZATION 5-1 to 5-86
A. Introduction 5-1
B, Pacification: A Key Variable in the
Counterinsurgency Formula 5-2
1, Early Pacification Efforts 5-2
2. The Process Defined 5-4
C. Early Pacification Efforts: The Ngo
Experiments (1954-1963) 5-6
1. Civic Action 5-7
*
2. The Land Development Program 5-9
3. Agglomeration Camps and Agrovilles 5-12
4. Strategic Hamlets 5-17
5. The Civilians' Irregular Defense Groups
(CIDG) Experiment 5-26
6. The Territorial Forces -- Civil Guard
and Self-Defense Corps 5-28
7. Early Program Results and Impact on the
War Effort 5-30
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