0 - The Black Vault

THE BDM CORPORATION
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was alleged stifling of critical reports), Ambassador Martin's embassy
apparently was doing exactly what President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger
wanted--reporting that the RVNAF could "hack it" alone and that Thieu's
government hau the support of a broad political base,
C, INSIGHTS
The following insights were developed from the analyses and assessmeats
drain in this chaptere
Until the final collapse, right or wrong, American national
leadership was convinced that the US must pursue a policy which
would prevent the 'Jss of South Vietnar to the communists from
the North,
Those various policies provided sufficient support to
accomplish that ,2jective,
could be disengaged and withdrawn.
at least until US ground combat forces
• As long aý the general doctrine of military containment of communism
was the official US
policy, the decision specifically to
intervene in Vietnam has to be considered a logical reaction.
The domino theury saw any conflict with the communists as a test
i.
of the US's natiopal resolve and credibility. The communists had
threatened to take over "free world" territory in Berlin, Korea,
Iran, Guatemala, Lebanon and the Dominican Republic, and actions
taken by the US to prevent the loss of these territories were
viewed by many as American "Cold War" successes,
Conversely, the
communists' gaining control over China and Cuba were viewed as
"cold war" defeats for the US. Each successive US president
durir.q rhis period found himself bound, in large measure, by his
predecessor's doctrinas and thereafter analyzing issues from the
i -same perspective in continuance of policies long after they
outlived their usefulness.
Throughout the entire period of US involvement in Indocnina, from
1950 until 1975, the policy of containment worked and South
Vietnam was not lost to communism.
At each key or crucial decision
point, following the initial commitment, US policy makers
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