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0 - The Black Vault

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THE BDM COP PORATION<br />

forces was<br />

<strong>The</strong> programmed and planned force structure of the GVN's military<br />

used as a basic starting point in the redeployment planning<br />

process. In essence, this required a detailed evaluation of RVNAF<br />

w 4 ssion<br />

capabilities projected for the fourth quarter of Cv 1972, For example, if<br />

10 medium truck companies weee a programmed RVNAF furce requ~rement and<br />

only eight comoanies werc in the force structure in the mid-fourth-quarter<br />

of CY 1972, with the remaining two companies programmed to be formed and<br />

operational sometime in 1973, then a US capability to provide for the<br />

shortfall was retained in-country, 23/<br />

In this manner a list of US forces<br />

required i-, country to match the GVN shortfall was initially developed. A<br />

mission analysis of all US •crces stationed in country was also undertaken<br />

to identify those units which would be required to remain in country in<br />

support of the US forces earmarked in the shortfall category.<br />

<strong>The</strong> requirements for the US advisory element in contry, beyond<br />

the fourth quarter of CY 1972, were also examined to determine what reductions<br />

and reorganizations would be needed in that time frame. It was<br />

envisioned that a small advisory team at the ARVN<br />

division level would be<br />

appropri ate.<br />

A reinforced airmobile element was retained in country to provide<br />

MACV with a US security force. Additionally the 196th Brigade was retained<br />

in MR I to provide security for the substantial residual US air force<br />

elemEnts that would be required to continue operating out of Da Nang air<br />

base, While GVN forces were expected to assume increasing respori.ibility<br />

for providing iocal security of residual US forces, it was felt not in the<br />

best interest of tho US to be solely dependent upon them for security of<br />

the command. Additionally, it was considered prudent to have quickly<br />

available in country a small US force for emergencies or other unforeseen<br />

cont•ngency situations.<br />

A command and control structure for the residual forces was aisc<br />

developed in order to determine what changes were necessary in the existing<br />

levels of headquarters in the country, and wnen they should be undertaken.<br />

After having ccoped the size and composition of the 60,000 man<br />

force to remain in country beyond September of 1972, planning focused on<br />

6-8

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