0 - The Black Vault

THE BDM CORPORATION
9 The Impcrtance of Intelligence, Without reliable intelligence on
the intsurgents, a threatened government is likely to oe at such a
SI disadvantage that assistarce, at almost any level , would be
ireffective, A local intelligence capability is therefore a
high-priority matter, and the US should have assured that one was
L organized prior to making its commitment to the RVN for extensive
V
pacification assistance.
* The Use of Police and Constabulary Forces, Early on, the GVN/US
pacification effort failed to use local police and constabulary
aqsets effectively..
Properly equipped and trained police forces
couid have been an effective tool in reducing communist control
of the South Vietnamese countryside..
0 The Extensive Use of Regular and Paramilitary Unts With
Aggressive, Small-Unit Tactics, In Vietnam preciou: time was
lost because the ARVN and the Territorial Forces werr reluctant
to press the battle with Viet Cong guerrilla elements.
Such a
counterinsurgency strategy calls for aggressive small-unit
action, which in turn calls for competent junicr and noncommissioned
officers and realistic training programs,
0 Development Programs and Their Relationship to the Pacification
Effort. There should be early agreement on the role of economic,
3ocial, and political programs. Because such agreement was
lacking in Vietnam, a plethora of nonmilitary activities were
undertaken, many of which were redundant, unwanted, or even
counterproductive to the goal of defeating the insurgents.
a Handling of Grievances. In countering any insurgency, a vigorous
and sustained effort must be made at the earliest possible moment
to redress genuine grievances, Indeed, serious consideration
should be given to conditioning US assistance to the government's
taking such action. in South Vietnam, land reform constituted
such a real and urgent need.
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