0 - The Black Vault

THE BDM CORPORATION
more effective Ambassador.52/ Fcllowing a visit to RVN in December 1964,
Secretary of Defense McNamara,
commenting on the organizational and admin-
"F istrative problems of the Country Team under Lodge, said the Embassy
Country Team "lacked leadership," had been "poorly informed" and had "grave
reporting" weaknesses.53/
On the other hand, the Embassy under Ambassador Taylor was a
model of coordination and coope-ation. Taylor arrived on station in July
1964 with a letter of instruction from the President giving him full
control of both US civilian and US miiitarý ictivities in RVN, affording
him the powers equivalent to a proconsul. Ambassador Taylor patterned the
US Mission--consisting of the US Mission Council, the Embassy, MACV, USOM
and JUSPAO (Joint US Public Affairs Office)--to fu;iction along the lines .f
* a 'rnini-NSC."54/ (See Figures 2-3 through 2-8 for the organization charts
of each element of the US Mission under Ambassador Taylor,)
was the constantly revolving RVN
Regardless, it
governments that hindered his efforts to
implement US policies with respect to South Vietnam. As a consequence, a
frustrated Taylo,, called the key South Vietnamese military leaders into his
Embassy office in December 1964, and he proceeued to dress them down like
first ycar cadets. All of which caused General Khanh to accuse the
Ambassador of "meddling", "abusing his power" and exhibiting "a discourteous
attitude" toward RVN leadership.55/
e. Assessment of Phase 2 Effectiveness
During this phase, the US foreign policy with respect to
South Vietnam has to be rated as something less than successful,
President
Kennedy embraced his predecessors' foreign policy for the region except for
one major revision--he did not press for "united action" with respect to
the conflict in RVN, Somehow the precondition set by President Eisenhower
for "united action" was never a consideration and President Kennedy's
administration embarked on the da•ngerous
course of unilateral action in
Vietnam. US meddling and heavy-handedness with regard to the internal
affairs of the South Vietnamese government,
coupled with the calloused
participation in the overthrow of President Diem, served to deepen,
2-31