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THE BDM CORPORATION<br />

US<br />

did not at first have .a ready resporse to the conflict or to rural<br />

pacif;.atioi. Until Presidert Kennedy approved the Counterinsurgency Plan<br />

(riP) for Vietnam in 196,, 'he gap had been filled largely by a military<br />

r,ý 4 ponsa such as military civic action. a.,d improved propaganda and concentrated<br />

upon me3sures to transform the RVNAF<br />

into an effective military<br />

a["-;ra-Js. mobile and professionally managed, able to concentrate its<br />

ftoces effectively when required to strike a massive blow., It was believea<br />

that such a conventional force, properly supported by a competent intelligence<br />

effort, could easily meet and defeat the poorly arme d insurgents as<br />

"a lesser 4ncluded capability" of its newfound irof~ciency.46/ <strong>The</strong> CIP was<br />

one of the ea-.'ly expedient measures taKen; anotner was the Geographically<br />

Phased National Plan, a plan designed to clear priority target areas in<br />

phases, with the end result being a secure region to turn over to loyal<br />

inhabitants.<br />

As discussed ii Chapter 5, Vlm Iof this study, the CIP<br />

encompassed a good deal more t'ian military matters., For example, it called<br />

for President Diem to reorganize his government for greater efficiency,<br />

broaden its base, and eliminate corruption..<br />

<strong>The</strong> US failed to apply leverage<br />

3n the Ngo regime and ultimately abandoned the conditions in order "to<br />

get on with the war.."47/<br />

As it tt,'ns oL't, n~ither the CIP nor the Geographically<br />

Phased Plan was ever fully implementad.<br />

Diem made some conciliatory gestures,<br />

then he went about doing things a-, he wished -- US counterinsurgency<br />

strategy was not accepted; nevertheless, additional US aid continued<br />

unabated.<br />

Experts conclude that Diem's solution to the insurgency problem<br />

at that time was to focus not upon the military aspect but upon the village<br />

and hamlet population, with the purpose being to "dry up the sea of<br />

friendly peasantry in vhich swam the VC 'fish'" 48/<br />

"In 1962. the GVN launched "Operation Sunrise," which was the<br />

first large scale resettlement combining GVN and US inputs under the Strategic<br />

Hamlet Program.<br />

Operation Sunrise (see Figure 5-7 fcr a portrayal of<br />

the region) focused on a cluster of villages in. Binh Duong province,<br />

heavily infested area northeast of Saigon that had strategic significance<br />

a<br />

5-20<br />

- 4• . . .

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