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THE 8DM CORPORATION<br />

I<br />

. provide conditions conduciv, to the futuri_ .pendet political<br />

iJevzlopment of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.<br />

<strong>The</strong> signatories to the Armistice w, delegates of the<br />

Generals in Command of the combat forces.<br />

<strong>The</strong> DRV slL,,ed all three agreements<br />

(for separate cease-fires in, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), while<br />

France signed the Vietnam and Laos agreements, <strong>The</strong> Khmer National Army<br />

signed the Cambodian one.14/<br />

<strong>The</strong> Final Declaration, wh-'ch ca>,?d for a<br />

political settlement -- electicns in Laos and Cambodi,-, in 1955 and in<br />

Vietnam in 1956 -- was not signed by any of the participants,<br />

<strong>The</strong> French and Viet Minh were the designated executors of<br />

the Accords, while the GV14, under the Bao Dai regime, clearly repudiated<br />

the Accords 3nd declined to accept any responsibility for observing or<br />

enforcing them. In fact, the GVN was given its independence by France<br />

before the Accords were signed, and they were treated as a separate state<br />

throughout the conference. <strong>The</strong> GVN signed nothing at Geneva. Through the<br />

concessions of the communist countries and the firmness of its Western<br />

Allies, the GVN had been given an opportunity to get its act together and<br />

consolidate itself.<br />

A few days after the Accords had been signed, Secretary of<br />

State Dulles, referring to "the loss of Northern Vietnam", expresseu the<br />

F hope that much would be learned frcm the experience toward preventing<br />

further communist inroads in Asia.<br />

Smith,<br />

Under Secretary of State Walter 3edell<br />

in a separate declaration, said that the US would "refrain from the<br />

threat or the use of force to disturb" the agreements and "would view any<br />

renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with<br />

grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."15/<br />

1) Outcomes as Viewed by the Participating Nations 16/<br />

* United States<br />

- public view was cautious, the best of a bad situation<br />

- private reactions were gloomy: NSC evaluated the<br />

conference as a major defeat, OCB considered it a<br />

7-6

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