0 - The Black Vault

THE BOM CORPORATION
Ambassador Harriman got back into the peace talks
picture by working out a plan for secret negotiations in Paris.
formal talks were held, his efforts were frustrated by a DRV
Though
offensive in
the South and a corresponding hardening of LBJQs position with regard to
the risk3 involved in announcing a total bomuing halt.. On November 6,
1968, the talks finally got underway, only to be plagued by the GVN's
unwillingness to sit at the same table with the NLF, among other issues.
Other analysts have suggested that the elpction of Richard Nixon in 1968
4 also contributed to the eroding of the chance for a military settlement in
the fall of that year. 72/
7) Outcomes of tr,e Mid-Phase Init;atives
This phase sao the 'evel of US involvement in Vietnam
increase to the point where the US was actually at war. Thereafter, the
prospect of obtaining a negotiated settlement became
less likely., There
were some US officials who believed that the war could be "won": others
thought that the "US must give clear evidence that it intends to win in
South Vietnam" Lefore Hanoi would be willing te negotiate.73/
believed that the DRV
Still others
wct.ld be ,Forely pressed by US/GVN combat forces in
the South and US bombing in the North. "hus, they believed that by
stages, the DRV would withdraw their support for the VC, and the war would
subside 3nd eventually disappear, leaiing neither side faced with the
knotty problenm of fdce-to-face negotiations. 74/ Those official perceptions
tended to stiffen US terms for a negotiated settlement during this phase,
8) Ijgmact of the Mid-Phase In;tiatives
The US soun discovered that limited military pressure
on Hanoi was not having any impact on their attitude toward negotiating.
Selective bombing,
which was supposed to be a suotle diplomatic orchestration
of ,ignals and
way to sustained reprisals.
the enemy.
incentives--an excercise in carrots and stlcks--gave
It succeeded in neither signaling nor smashing
As the war intensified ii 1966 and 1967, the prospects
for negotiation~s dimmed. Disagreement continued amcng USG officials on thL
appropriate -,inimum position that would be acceptable to Hanoi.
The DRV
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