0 - The Black Vault

THE BOM CORPORATION
English training proved to be a significant obstacle in CONUS training for
all RVN military services, particularly the Air Force. The lack of effective
aptitude testing in country added to the problem since there was no
way to determine if the student who successfully completed 36 weeks in
language training had the aptitude to complete the end course of instruction
successfully, i.e. , vehicle mechanic, radio mechanic, communications
officer, helicopter pilot, etc.
Attempts to develop a master train`nc plan
for the RVNAF began in 1968-1969, far too late in the process. The plan
identified only the t-aining requirements with little focus on problems
Santicipated in its implementation. A higher priority should have been
given to the overall RVN training problem and the role of the uS training
establishments to provide the level and quality of instructicn required.,
It should be noted, however, that the Vietnamization program -- turning the
war over to GVN forces -- did not get priority attention until the Nixon
era.
Free World forces in GVN included those nations indicated in the
Appendix. Australia, New Zcaiand, Thailand, and the Republic of Korea cor,-
tributed combat forces, and the Republic of the Philippines provided a
civic action group which had its own security force.
Just as the US administration
was sensitive to casualty figures, so were the allied forces,
particularly the Korean and Thai torses whose contributions to field operations
were often criticized as being less aggressive than desired.
While
it was expected that allied free world forces would begin withdrawal of
tUeir forces along with the US
of the two South Korcan divisiun5 positioned in MR
force withdrawal ,tne timing for withdrawal
I and II impacted or the
US redeployment plan. Since US combat forces in MR I were earmarked for
late withdrawal in the planning effort and a new ARVN division was to be
established in MR I, it was important that combat strength levels in "R I
be maintained until an orderly adjustment of the RVNAF
force deployment
could be effected. In that regard, retention of the two ROK combat nivisions
was necessary.
Protection of the US command after late 1971 was largely dependent on
the ARVN forces. After the "ground combat role" had been assumed by ARVN
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