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THE BDM CO.RPORATION<br />

r<br />

tj7-13<br />

21<br />

power, to make infiltration and aggression less appetizing to the potential<br />

enemy.,<br />

Of the three protocol states, the most important in the eyes of US<br />

leadership. was the newly created South Vietnam.<br />

Although SEATO was intentionally ambiguous on the point<br />

of just what response would be made by tha members in the event of an armed<br />

attack, it did provide Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon<br />

with a justification fo;r subsequent US policy -- aid and military presence<br />

in Vietnam.<br />

Though n(. one seriously challanged US military and economic<br />

aid provisions under the SEUTO<br />

Treatj, the Johnson and Nixop administrations<br />

came und'r fire for the use of US<br />

ground combat forces in the conflict.<br />

SEAFO may have delayed communist aggression in Southeast<br />

Asia, but in the end,<br />

the treaty organization did not deter the communists<br />

from actively pursuing their goals there.<br />

2. Phase 2: 1961 to Mid-1968<br />

Early on in this phase, the overriding US objective was to limit<br />

"involvement in what President Kennedy anc Secretary of Defense McNamara<br />

regarded as essentially a Vietnamese war., In the spring of l962, the<br />

military situation in South Vietnam was showing some signs of improvement,<br />

and by mid-year the prospects looked bright for the RVNAF, To some, the<br />

end to the insurgency seemed<br />

in sight. although that optimism was not<br />

without the recognition that there were unsolved political problems and<br />

serious soft spots in areas of the military effort, US<br />

leadership, both on<br />

the scene in Vietnam and in Washington, was c)nfident though cautiously<br />

optimistic.28/<br />

During the same timeframe,<br />

events in other parts of the world,<br />

some ostensibly unrelated, were asserting direct relevance on US policy in<br />

Vietnair. Developments in Berlin, Cuba and Ldos far overshaaowed Vietnam,<br />

and forced the Kennedy Administration to put Vietnam in the perspective of<br />

14<br />

other US world interests.<br />

_4<br />

With respect to Indochina, the Kennedy Administration established<br />

the following objectives:30/<br />

* to seek the neutralization of Laos<br />

* to avoid an open-ended Asian mairland land war

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