0 - The Black Vault

THE BoM CORPORAT'ON
of the Free World
Forces nad a dif'erent approach to pacification within
its Tactical Areas of Responsibilicy (TAOR),
which highlighted why the U3
and GVN were having difficulties with their pacification effortslOl/
Meanwhile, much to their amazement, the iII MAF Marines discovered
that the toughest war was in the villages near and in the vicinity
of the Da Nang Air Base, rather than the war against PAVN Main Force elements,
which had retreated to the hills to regroup, rearm and buila UDr
Within the first year of operations, the Marines virtually reversed their
empriasis,
turning away from the VC/PAVN enemy to the grueling and painfully
slow effort of pacifying the vill'ages within their TAOR. Unfortunately, it
was a task that the Marine combat units were not manned nor equipped for,
and their efforts raised some basic questions about the role of US troops
in Vietnam. Nonetheless, the Marines tried valiantly to make tneir efforts
pay off, convince otners in the US
government of its efficacy, and demonstrate
the correctness of their still-unproved strategy.
The result was a
major commitment to the pacification program by a service of the US Armed
Forces ard it produced a significant impact on the pacification approach by
the other services, particularly the Army.
An embassy report, submitted in April l965, summed up how
involved with 1 ocal politics the Marines were becoming, though unintentionally,
and said.
The plan [pacification of Quanq Nam!, despite tne
valiant efforts of the Marines, is in trouble, caused
by a confused and fragmented chaia A1 command, a lack
of -killed cadre, inability to recruit locally RF and
PF-ana the open oppusition of the VNQDD [Vietnam Quoc
Dan Dang, the political party controlling the provinces
of Quang Ngai, Quang Nam and Quang rin]., 102/
The requirements for a successful pacification strategy were
clear:, the provision of continuous local security, the restoration of
effective, respnnsible local government; and, the improvement of local
living conditions.
5-42