0 - The Black Vault

THE 8DM CORPORATION
INSIGHTS
US Foreign As long as containment of communism was the offi-
Policy cial US policy, the decision to intervene in
Vietnam has to be considered a logical reaction.
The domino theory saw any conflict with the communists
as a test of the US's national resolve and
credibility. The Communists' gaining control over
China and Cuba were viewed as Cold War defeats for
the US, Each successive US president during this
period found himself bound, in large measure, by
his predecessor's policies.
Tihroughout the entire period of US involvement in
Indochina, from 1 through 1975, the policy of
containment worked id South Vietnam was not lost
to communism. At each key decision point, following
the initial commitment, US policy makers
focused on how to contain or defeat communism in
Vietnam and not on the wisdom of being there in
the first place. Each escalation was seemingly in
response to the progressive escalation of the
price of keeping the original commitment to help
Vietnam. It was not until the "A to Z" reassessment
in 1968 that there was a thorough review made
of the US commitment.
A policy of unreserved commitment to a particular
leadership placed the US in a weak and manipulable
position on important internal issues in Vietnam.
The early view that there were no viable alternatives
to President Diem greatly limited the extent
of US influence over his regime and ruled out,
over the years, a number of kinds of leverage that
might have been employed to obtain desired goals.
The politico-military actions in the November 1963
coup against Diem would not have been possible
without US connivance. To acquiesce in or to promote
a coup makes sense onlly if positive results
can reasonab., be expected. The US Country Team
in Saigon, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US
Departments of State and Defense, and the National
Security Cauncil failed to identify a successor to
Diem who might have been acceptable to the Vietnamese
people as well as to the US and who might have
provided effective leadership.
EX-3