0 - The Black Vault

THE BDM CORPORATION
In turn, the US
the product of:
efforts to support GVN pacification program were
* reliance on conventional military methods, equipment and training
a
culturally unsuitable and impractical approaches to development
• an inability t) devise conceptually relevant programs
* ineffective and insufficient application of leverage on the
GVN 161/
Between 1968 and 1973 the GVN, with strong US aid, turned things
around, and achieved success in their pacification and development programs
F
primarily because:
priority was finally given, to security -- protecting and involving
the people in their own defense
* policies of land reform and economic redistribution were promoted
The one key thing which the Thieu government failed to do during this
period of pacification progress was to fashion a political ccmmunity.162/
As Ambassador Samuel Berger, deputy to Ambassador Bunker from 1968 tu 1971
said, "Thieu failed to institutionalize his government" 163/ thereby losing
the gains made through pacification.
Regardless, there is little coubt, having the advantage of hindsight,
that pacification finally worked. The North Vietnamese ultimately
could not have won the war via insurgency, but rather they had to resort to
conventional military offensives by PAVN troops. in that sense pacification
did succeed, though it alone, without a strong political base, could
not withstand the final DRV onslaught.
Other pacification insights are-
0 Security is a Prerequisite for Pacification. While both the
provision of local security and certain nonmilitary undertakings
are essential parts of a successful pacification program,
- conditions for a sustained government presence mdst prevail if
development efforts are to pay off. By eventually whittling down
the enemy's political and military apparatus in the villages and
hamlets of Vietnam, the GVN/1IS pacification effort began to pay
off.
the
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