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THE BDM CORPORATION<br />

P_<br />

<strong>The</strong> Vietnamization and negitiatirn approach, how~ever, was viewed with<br />

varyi-g degrees --f skeptic-ism by the key decision makers,<br />

President Nixun<br />

was most skeptical about efforts to negctLiat-e.. He: didn't 'elieve that<br />

negotiations would amount to anything until the military situation changed<br />

fundamentally, aoid he was not too eager for negotiations until some military<br />

progress had been made.8/ Oncp the initial withdrawal announcement<br />

Lad been made, Kissinger, as did others, saw that the adminiistration would<br />

be pressurea more and more by the public and the administration's critics<br />

to accelerate the withdrawal at an ever increasing level, This expected<br />

increased pressurA. to expedite withdrawal of US forces could onily serve to<br />

stren~gthen Hanoi's position in trne upcoming nagotiat Ing process,~<br />

Secretary of P~efen~ze Lair~d was a5 skeptical about the utility of<br />

negotiations as he was abou~t the possiuility of miiayviccory, He felt<br />

it' was esssrntial to get the Unitced States out, ,f Vietnam beforu the administration<br />

lo-,t too 'much domestic support. Both Nixon arid Kissinger', however,<br />

thought Lhat Vietnamiztation should oroceed less precipitantly than<br />

Secretary of De'fense Laird advised.<br />

President Nixon repeatedly told the<br />

puolic aod his aides that he wanted a peace and not an armistice -- a peace<br />

that would last. According to some enalysts, Nixon intended Saigon to have<br />

"thie mraximium amnount of time to develop ar. etfective 5elf-defense capabiiity."9/<br />

Hence V-etnamizatinn had to proceed slowly so as to develop P'INAF<br />

I ~ ~<br />

capability -tc handle what would be an obviouslfy serious threat from the<br />

%ortni Vietnamrese for sometime to com~e. 10/ Ki ssinger sZw V~etnzimi~zation as<br />

essential to assure, when ar agreement wias at nand, that Saicgjn woulao ave<br />

little ground oil which to argue that it was premature~ll/<br />

B., CONSIDERATI0ONS IN PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING US WITHDRAWAL<br />

<strong>The</strong> l~ohnson Ad,-i ni stration establ ished a troop ceiIi ng of 549, E.30 f or<br />

SouTh Vietnam in April 1963. That tr'oop ceiling included all military<br />

persoornel atithorized in the country of South Vietnami, but did riot include.<br />

naval forces~ operating ol~f shora with the Seventh Fleet no,~ US iforres<br />

stationed outside the couoitry, i.e. , Thailand, Phi lippines, rccc., Actual U'5<br />

6-3

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