0 - The Black Vault

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THE BDM CORPORATiON
I
A completely fair zjssessment of the above conclusions
is difficult, at best, t-1 make with the limited material available, and it
may nct be possible to do it thoroughly for many years, But it is clear
than many critics have tended to cversimplify the problem. Given the
conditions at the time, the means for motivat;ng all sides into taking
rapid and dramatic action were not always present. All parties involved
faced enormous difficulties. Indeed, the terdency of each side to overestimate
the freedom of maneuver of the other certainly contributed to the
distrust that developed over time, It caused the DRV to appear perversely
obstinate and deceitful to the US, and the US to seem devious and obtuse to
the DRV.
Washington's hope for ending the war depended on success
on the battlefield. Achieving a position of strength became an essen-
Stial prerequisite for ncgotiations. LBJ quickly realized that such a
position was not likly tx be achieved by merely strengthening the GVN. It
became essential to ,ncrease military pressure on the DRV
Hanoi to negotiate.
and thus compel
The DRV's leaders on the other hand, chose to refuse to
neqotiate because they were convinced that:
a the US could nct "win" the war as long as the NVA/VC could choose
the time and place of the major battles (therefore control their
own battlefield attrition)
• the GVN would not make the internal reforms necessary to compete
politically with the NLF
0 the US and dorld public opinion would eventually force LBJ to
call an end to the bombing of the North in return for the promise
of negotiations.
As a consequence of the foregoing, .4hen the US or
intermediaries made proposals, the DRV assessed each in terms of whether or
not the immediate situation on the battlefield permitted the offer to be
rejected.
I
In the twilight of President Johnson's Administration,
the US involvement in Vietnam began to level off and start its decline.
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