0 - The Black Vault

THE BDM CORFORATION
failed. Nevertheless, the enemy's third phase, which
is designed to seize Quang Tri and Tnua Thien provinces
V has just begun. 38/
General Westmoreland thought the DRV's offensive to that
"point was only a prelude to the enemy's main effort (or third phase) which
he calculated would be directed against the two northerp provinces of RVN.
thought that the focus SHe of the DRV .,ttack would be the embattled Marine
bastion at Khe Sanh. By dttacking the nortiern-most provinces, he reasoned
that the )RV woulc have had the advantlge zf shortened lines of communication
and the ability to concentrate heavy artilliey fires from the DMZ.
The General reinforced his I Corps elements from in-country assets, and
wired the JC- to ask for "emergency' refnforcemerts (about six maneuver
battalions) which would have allowed him to cagitaiize on the enemy's
iosses and seize the initiative in other areas of RVN.39/
-JCS,
Three plains for emergency renforcement were examined by the
After brief celiberation the JCS recommended against the deployment
of the nu-'..rs of troops requesteG oy the COMUSMACV. They had come to the
realization tat US military resources had been drawn too thin, assets had
become unavailable and tha US suprp,'t base had become too small. Overriding
the JCS recommendation, President 2ohnson directed Secretary
MvcNamara to deploy one brigade of the 82d Airoo'ne Division ard one Marine
regimental landing team to South Vietnam imr 1 ediately.4_Oi This emergency
reirforcemanL amounted to an increase of ablut 10,51.0 men.
The JCS reacted almost immediately on the presidential
decision to depluy those forces from tne nation's strategic active reserve
without a concomitant reserve call-up, On February 13. ' 1 C8, they forwarded
co Secretary tcNamara their recommerdations for actions which had to
be taken relative to a minimum call-up of reserves.
minimum call-up was as follows:
The rationale used by the JCS *,,-
their recommendation for
. Since the 82d Airborne represented the only deployable Army
division in the CONUS-based active strategic rýserve, it
had to
be reconstituted promptly by a reserwe :all-up (betwLen O,000
and 40,00
men).
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