0 - The Black Vault

THE BCM CORPORATION
over Laos, "tried to hold onto it, which is why we gave aid through the
CIA",.37/ This commitment continued through the Johnson and Nixon administrations,
and led to a complicated series of command arrangements and
restrictions on US operations which would continue throughout the period of
US involvement.,38/
It should be noted that COMUSMACV had given consideration in
1964 to establishing an international force below the DMZ and across Laos,
generally along Route 9.
In 1967 contingency plans were prepared for a
corps-size force of three divisions to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos.
Sufficient forces were not available for suich an operation until 1968, oy
which time President johnsun was beset by war critics and was unable to
expand the war. 39/
c. Cambodian Instability
US contingency plans generally had recognized that enemy
forces would use sanctuary areas. Due largely to the instability of the
Sihanouk government, PAVN (NVA) troops used parts of eastern Cambodia as
base and sanctuary areas, from which to launch raids into RVN.
As in the
case of Laos, US policy-makers found no effective alternative to prevent
use of those sanctuary areas. Covert, small-scale raids and intelligence
reconnaissance patrols by US and ARVN troops were launched irto tne-e
areas, but had no decisive effect.
In efforts to deny some of the major
Cambodian sanctuary areas, the US began a series of B-52 strikes in eastern
Cambodia in March 1969 (see Chapter 6 Volume VI).
d.,
PRC'USSR Attitudes
Early US
contingency plans were based on the expectation
that China could intervene at any time. In addition to warnings i .suea by
General MacArthur not to become enmeshed on Lie Asian mainland in the
1950s, the Chinese road-building program in the far northern part of Laos
in 1960-61 as well as the CPR's border war with India in 1962 indicated the
possibility of Chinese military intervention against US forces. By the
mid-1960s, however, Chira became internally convulsed by the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution and its capabilities and will to intervene
ir force dwindled.
I .3-12