0 - The Black Vault

THEBDM CORPORATION
Congress,
in the face of a badly weakened executive, became increasingly
anxious to liquidate any further US involvement in Southeast Asia.
G. INSIGHTS
I. Knowing the Enemy and Ou- Ally
This is a recurring theme which was played in Volumes I and I! of
this study. The US misread and underestimated the enemy's tenacity and
determination to prevail at any cost. The North Vietnamese proved to be
resourceful and able to learn from past mistakes. Their approach to insurgency
was a stage-by-stage revolutionary process, based on redistributive
policies of a socio-economic nature enforced by violence.
With respect to knowing our ally, the US misread and underestimated
the resolve, determination, character and will of the South
Vietnamese people. In the end, after years of UG commitment and assistance,
the South Vietnamese felt that US
interest in their cause had waned
greatly, whereas the enemy's support from the communist world continued
unabated.
2. Pacification
Between 1954 and mid-1368, the GVN's attempts at establishing
pacification and rural development programs failed because they were little
more than
I
ill-devised blends of stop and star..,:
military and police operations
• social control techniques
0 emergency welfare efforts
0 attempts to extend political-administrative linkage from Saigon
to the countryside.
During the period, the GVN failed to come to terms with the
communist movement because of their own fundamental political weaknesses,
which were:-
* their inheritance of France's colonial legacy
j
their debilitating internal pursuit of power
A their reliance on US aid and doctrine rather than internal political
support.
I• 5-68