0 - The Black Vault

THE BDM CORPORATION
in accordance with the schedule of Vietnamization program -- Phase I -- the
US command was pressured by the administration to withdraw all grojiid
combat forces from thE country. Tuie command frequently argued the need for
conducting a "dynamic defense" during the course of the withdrawal and a US
combat forre, to remain in country, was essential for security of the
command. Nevertheless tne 3d Bde, Ist Cav which had been designated in the
MACV
MR
redeployment plan as the contingency force along with the 196th Bde in
I were redeployed in July-August 1972 leaving 40,000 US military remaining
in country.
The principle of maintaining a balanced fcrce throughout
the course of the withdrawal was no longer possible.
Gi'ven the situation, the increasing US reliance on RVNAF for security
appeared to be unwise and not without grave risk to the US
civilian forces remaining in country.
military and
Further, it placed an additicnal and
unnecessary burden on the already strainea RVNAF ground forces,
The key insights from the study of US withdrcwal planning are as
follows:V The Pr,:sident, driven by domestic considerations, set the pace of
US withdrawal and announced the rate of withdrawal to MACV planner-
virtually without warning. This procedure left MACV too
litt+'
flexibility to design witharawal plans which would ensure
that -che RVNAF cnuld successfully assume the oiverse responsibilities
which it was now required to fulfill.
0 MACV wa, forced to serve two differeri; masters with aifferent
aimrs. the Secretary of Defense who pressed fo- accelerated
withdrawals, and the National Security Adviser who required
continued U. combat presence in Vietnam as a neciotiating chip.
E. LESSONS
* Withdrawal of combat forces may be accomplished in a hostile or
non-hostile environment; ei-her case requires efficient planning
by trained personnel who are in pcssezsion of all et the -equired
informaLion, anL the senior field force commander must oesignate
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