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THE BDM CORPORATION<br />

Richard B. Clement and Jacob Van Staaveren, Number 501, US Air Force<br />

Oral History Program (Declassified December 31, 1978), p, 4.<br />

33, Details concerning the stay-behind cadres and their eventual augmentation<br />

are provioed in Chapters 3 and 5 of Volume 1 of this study. One<br />

of the opportunities seized on by the DIV was to send intelligence<br />

personnel South in the guise of recovering remains of deceased Viet<br />

,inh. <strong>The</strong>se "grave teams" conducted agitprop activitie3 and gathered<br />

intell gence. This situation was -eported by Anita Lauve, a foreign<br />

service officer serving with the US Embassy in Saigon during that<br />

period. Her comment aas made during an 8 Juie 1979 BOM interview with<br />

former GVN Ambassador Bui Diem..<br />

1. Mr.<br />

V 34. Interview on 13 November 1979 with Colonel J.A. MacDonald, USMC (Ret)<br />

who, in 1968-69 was Chief, US/SEATO Plans Division, J-52, USMACV. <strong>The</strong><br />

.1-52 Division was responsible for maintaining/updating the SEATO Plans<br />

prepared for COMUSMACV who was also designed as Commander, Certral<br />

Region, SEATO field forces for defense of Thailand and the protocol<br />

states,<br />

35. James H., Hanse:,, "Seven Points for Laos" research paper, 22 June 1968.<br />

Hansen, now with BDM Corporation, monitored the Laotian political<br />

scene before teaching an undergraduate course in international relations<br />

at the University of Michigan. His research concluded that this<br />

double standard on the "troops in Lacs" issue out US forces at a major<br />

disadvantage throughout the war.<br />

36, According to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, the PRC 5 road building in<br />

northern Laos in 1960-61 was thought to threaten Thiland, but US<br />

authorities fearcd that a US move into Laos (before such a move was<br />

prohitited by the 1962 Geneva Accords) would bring the Chinese in and<br />

force a US retreat to the Kra Dennisula and abandonment of Thailand.<br />

US decision makers found they held no capability to intervene militarily<br />

in Laos. Comments by Ambassador Johnson during the BDM Senior<br />

Review Panel meeting on 13 February 1979.<br />

37, Senior Review Panel meeting at BDM/Washington on 13 Pebruary 1979.<br />

Ambassador Colby is one of the more Knowledgeable exnfficiails about<br />

the "secret war" in Laos. General DePuy, fcrmer J-3 'IACV, and later<br />

commander of the 1st Division commented that Ambassador Sullivan kept<br />

the US military out of Laos and the CIA had a great time with their<br />

little war there. BDM interview of General William DePuy, 24 Seotember<br />

1978.<br />

38. MG Oudone Sananikone, RLA, Th,, Royal Lao Army and US Army Advice and<br />

Suport (McLean, VA: General.esearch Corporation), indochina Refugee<br />

Authored Monograph Program, prepared for Department of the Army, Office<br />

of Chief of Military History, pp. 74-7'* and 108-110, describes some of<br />

the early White Star activities in Laos prior to the 1962 accords.<br />

For a discussion of command relationships, see Chapter 11, Volume VI,<br />

3-27

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