0 - The Black Vault

THE BDM CORPORATION
I
At last, or so it seemed, the US was no longer fearful of Soviet or Chinese
intervention in the conflict, and therefore could use the force necessary
to bring about an acceptable end to US involvement. The DRV, sensing
possible isolation and stalemate on the battlefield, began to make sounds
like they wanted to gec. down to discussing matters of substance.
d, An Agreement at Last
By July 1972 with negotiations again underway in earnest,
there was apparent agreement on the following issues:.
e
the principle cf a total US withdrawal
* the release of POWs
* the reaffirmation of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements
9 an internationally supervised cease-fire in-place at the end.
Howevwr, two basic disputes remained. They were:
* the demand for reparations, and
* the DRV's insistence that the US overthrow the GVN.134/
Mr.
Kissinger noted sigrificant movement cn the part of the
DRV throughout the summer. Hanoi, probdbly convinced that Presidert Nixon
would be much stronger after the November presidential elections, began -o
press for quick settlement. The bombing and mining was having their
iimpact. Kissinger saw this as "a great opportunity; unless it was grasped
the US nood was sch that even with an overwhelming mandate, Nixon would
quickly be pushed against the grindstone of congressional jressures to end
the wa7 on almost any terms."135/
Tn October 1972, after an unprecedented four-day secret
session in Paris, Le Duc Tho presented the PRV's new proposals.
Included
was a military settlement -- withdrawal, POWs, cease-fire -- and a separate
political solution -- dropping demands for a coalition government and
accepting only an "Administration of National Concord,"137/ Tr~y no longer
insisted on an end to US military aid to RVN
after an agreement. Moreover,
the DRj agreed to cease their infiltration into RVN, which iý observed
would have guaranteed the erosion of North Vietnamese stay-behind ("leopard
spots") elements in the South.
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