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THE BDM CORPORATION<br />

establishing and scheduling the force jiicrements to be redeployed.,<br />

activity required the determination of units to be included in each force<br />

increment package, and the sizing of the package -- manpower spaces and<br />

tonnage,<br />

This<br />

analysis of port capability in country and available shipping.<br />

changes required in the existing stationing program, and impact on existing<br />

in-country interservice agreements.<br />

Frequent assessments of the enemy's capabilities were alsc condusted<br />

as the vulnerability of tne command in country would be increased<br />

with each force redeployment.<br />

<strong>The</strong> initial planning effort consiaered the<br />

continued presence of South Korea's two army divisions in the northern part<br />

of the country thru 1971, It was further assumed that the South Korean<br />

Marine Brigade would be returning to South Korea sometime in mid 1971. <strong>The</strong><br />

assessment of US withdrawals from MR I indicated an imralance of coGbat<br />

forces remaining in that region and the RVN<br />

force structure was amended to<br />

include provisions for an additional combat division in MR I. Unfortunately<br />

considerable delay was experienced in organizing and equipping the<br />

additional division (<strong>The</strong> division designated, the 3rd ARVN Division, was<br />

heavily pounded by greatly siperior NVA units in the Easter offensive, but<br />

before it broke it had held on at Dong Ha for a month),<br />

field commander,<br />

<strong>The</strong> need for tactical air resources, immediately available to the<br />

ground forces picked up.<br />

became increasingly important as the withdrawal of combat<br />

Where possible, tact~cal air units which could<br />

perform their missions from bases in Fhailand were relocated out of GVN<br />

order to permit maximum utilization of the ever-declining, troop-ceiling<br />

spaces authorized for the forces remaining in country.<br />

Table 6-1.<br />

Composition of the redeplovment force increments are indicated in<br />

in<br />

CC, ASSESSMENT OF US WITHDRAWAL<br />

1. Influences Leadin_ to Withdrawal<br />

A detailed discussion of the key decisions and decision makers<br />

involved in the US withdrawal from Vietnam is c-ovided in Volume III of<br />

6-9

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