0 - The Black Vault

F THE BDM CORPORATION
CHAPTER 8
FOLLOW-ON EFFOR T
It should be recognized that ii most of the curreit
conflicts Russian allies and client states (and conmunist
suppcrted revolutionary movements) are now in a
can-win can't-lose position because their rear, bases
are secure while those of America's allies ae
threatened., What is more, the latter only have to lose
once, This is a matter of attitude, credibility, will
and stamina - all very important weapons in anyone's
arnmoury but in rather short supply. If, through la,:k
of them, the American Congress under pressure fr)m
vocal elements in American society reduces aid to South
Vietnam below an adequate level (on the military siue
such aid is already well below the permitted one-forone
reolacement), there could be only one real less)n
to be Iearnt fromr the Vietnam war: - do not rely )n
the United States as an ally.l/
Sir Robert Thompson, "Milita-y
Victory: Political Defeat - Tie
Failure of US Strategy in Vietnam,"
1974,
After millions of words about the lessons of Vietnam,
we ignore the most important lesson, tha. political
battles cannot De ,esolved by force of arms.
We learned this lesson at great sacrifice to our
nation. Yet our policy-makers now are engaged in a
course of action which does not recognize this basic
reaiity of Indochina. The United States has embarked
upon a course of encoiraging the funding of maximum
military confrontation, hoping that somehow those we
are supporting can prevail.
A
... How can tre policy of military confrontation be
sustained when it is clear that neither the Congress
nor the American public is willing to fund the wars *in
Vietnam and Cambodia at high levels for the indefinite
future?2/
The Late Senator Hubert H. Humphrey,
in a speech on US aid appropriations
to Vietnam, 1974.
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