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THE BDM CORPORATION<br />

When Komer arrived in Vietnam a year later to become the first<br />

Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS),<br />

the following official aefinition for pacification had evolved-<br />

<strong>The</strong> military process of establishing sustained<br />

local security in the cuuntryside, the political process<br />

of establishing and re-establishing local government<br />

responsive to and involving the people and the<br />

economic and social process of meeting rural people's<br />

needs. 8/<br />

In the eyes of official Washington, pacification<br />

1.d become the "umbrella" under wMi-2 1 , all programs for<br />

winniog the "other war" could be placed. It encompassed<br />

the full spectrum of military, political and<br />

civil efforts in Vietnam. 9/<br />

C. EA1LY PACIFICATION EFFORTS: THE NGO EXPERIMENTS (1954-1963)<br />

Tne communists began to build up their clandestine political and military<br />

organizational base in South Vietnam in lq56 after it became clear<br />

that the governments in Washington and Saigon would not proceed with a<br />

plebiscite or reunification. Initially, their activities were primarily<br />

covert and directed toward the pelitical struggle. It is clear in retrospect<br />

that as their infrastructure grew the communists were preparing for a<br />

military struggle.<br />

Beginning in 1957 that military struggle was intensified<br />

and featured increased terrorism against officials, government installations<br />

and private individuals. 10/<br />

<strong>The</strong> US contribution during those early years haa little relevance to<br />

the problem of countering a low-level insurgency.,<br />

<strong>The</strong> MAAG Chief and most other American authorities considered the<br />

major threat to be an overt, mass attack by North ,ietnamese troops across<br />

the 17th parallel,. A conventionally trained and deployed South Viet.amese<br />

army was the result --<br />

at the expense of a buildup of the more relevant<br />

militia and police-type forces -- until early 1960, when the true nature of<br />

I.<br />

the then-existing threat to the RVN -- internal subversion -- was .,ecrgn<br />

ized. 11/<br />

74<br />

5-6

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