0 - The Black Vault

THE BDM CORPORATION
5. Other Factors
In retrospect, it dcas noc appear that -conomic or budgetary
factors were constraints in the development of US
the actual buildup of U 1 forces.,
ccntingency plans nr in
In both cuses, it was envisioned tnat a
conflict in Indochina would be "capital-intensive," as US forces would rely
on large imounts of (expensive) fireonwer delivered by aircraft and suph"-
sticated grnund weapons. By contrast the IS had expected enemy forces to
wage a similar type of "capital-intensive" i.onventional zorflict. Instead,
the enemy actually mounted a relatively low-cost guerrilla war until 1972•
The major domestic constraint on the initi~al US conduct of the war was a
political )ne. President Kennedy and Pre:rdent Johnson both sought to
minimize the scope ot the US commitmenit, even at the cosl of adopting
policies which r•n counter to traditional military doct..ine and s;-tategy.
6. MACV Cootingency Planning Post 1965
a.,
Unilateral Planning
After the influx of iarge numbers
of American tioop units
and the transformation of Headquarters, "SMACV into an operational headquar'ters
directing combat operations, there existed an apparent need for a
contingency planning capability within MACV, Previously, plannirg for
Southeast Asian contingencies had been accomplished by component commanders
of Pacific Command and their subordinate commanders,
Beginning in 1965 the
presence in RVN of signiricant US combat forces resulted i1 there being a
de facto commander on the spot, one whose :taff could produce the necessary
plans for likely contingencies using fcrces assigned to him plh. an\,
additional for-es earmarked by the JCS for hs use.5C/
A'n gen2ral, nEar-term operations or contingencies were
planneo for by the J-3 staff of MACV. For 3xample, plans prepared in 1969
fcr attacking into ;ambodia were prepared by tne J-3 even though there was
no auchorization for such attacks at that time.51/
U-ilateral U_ plans, such as the general war plan, the
deferse of Thailand and tie protocol states, the defense of RVN in the face
of a combhnea Chinese-North Vietnamese attack, arn cf.'tain sensitive code
word P.'.ns for cuvert operations %er3 drawn up in 6,Z 3-r staff.
I. 3-17