0 - The Black Vault

THE BDM CORPORATION
9. A Lesson Learned
Faced with budget cuts and lowered military manpower ceilings,
defense and armed forces leaders sought to preclude a repeat of the Vietnam
experience and the subsequent failure of the chief executive to mobilize
the Reserves.
The following actions were taken.
* In August 1970, Secretary of Defens2 Melvin R. Laird emphatically
affirmed that the Reserve components would be prepared to provide
8 the units and individuals required to augment the active forces
during the initial phases of any future expansion.
* In 1971, Mr. Laird announced that increased reliance would be
placed on the National Guard and Reserve,
Force Policy" was born.
and thus the "Total
* Through increased reliance un the Reserve components, the DOD was
z.3le to reduce 3ignificantly the size and structure of the active
forces.
* Reddiness requirements of the Reserve components were increased
to the point that many of those units woula be expected to deploy
aiong with active units,
0 The Army, under the airection of Chief of Staff General Creighton
W. Abrams, airoitly implemented the DUD Total Force Policy by
bolstering the responsiveness and strength of the Army's Reserve
components and by integrating them more effectively into the
overall effort.70/
General Abrams had in fact learned from the decision not to
mobilize during Vietnam, and he set about to build a leaner, responsive and
more capable Army. In 1974, he took the DOD-directed force of 13 active
divisions and eight Reserve component divisions and restructured tho force
to meet the Army's commitments. He increased tne Army's active force'to 16
divisions. In addition to increasing the active combat strength, he
retained eight division: in the Reserve component forces, and structured
three of the Army's sixteen divisions so that they would be "rounded out"
by an affiliated Reserve component brigade if and when committed.
In a
similar fashion, other CONUS divisions were organized to have affiliated
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