0 - The Black Vault

THE BDM
ORPORATION
In arriving at the negotiating stratey, Nixon and
Kissinger accepted i recommendation contained in NSSM-l
Ahich was that any
peace agreeme!.t should be aelayed for as long as possible to allow the
GVN to strengthen its position.n Mr. Nixon feared, however, that if the
negotiations were allowed to drag on too long, all parties (Hanoi,
Saigon
and official Washi~igton) would grow more intransigent. Obstacles to the
negotiations as Mr, Nixon viewed them were:
0 the DRV haa to have a reason to sign
• the GVN wanted the communists out of the South and to oe left
alone
* the US military establishment would not have accepted a compromise
(dt least at that tin'e).
Mr, Kissinger felt the key to a negctiated agreement was for the US to
avoid seeking to win at the conference table what could possibly be won on
the field of battle.97/
objectives were set
• a mutual cease-fire
After the deliberations, the following negotiating
• staged mutual withdrawals of external forces
* "n early reIease of prisoners of war (POWs)
0 internationally supervised electiens (to improve the political
environment).98/
To complement those objectives, the US launched the
Vietnamnzation Program and renewed its support of the GVN's Pacification
effort, Respectively, each was designed to strengthen the RVNAF
and pacify
the countryside as well as allow the US to reduce its military presence and
strengthen the popular support of the GVN.
Those in the US who adv(cated keeping maximum pressure
on the DRV
saw tne Vietnamization Program ai the only domestically acceptable
way of winding dcvr the war, They argLed chat it was the appropriate
US counter to the commwunist tactic k fighting while negetiating., Oth2rs
believci Vietnamization was acceptable but that the US should have begun
7-42