the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIES IN OPERATION 87
The army groups, needing security troops badly, requested Himmler
through OKH to release to them those native units under SS control in
the Reichskommissariate, but they were rebuked. 125
Thus frustrated in its attempt to solve the manpower problem locally,
OKH transferred two Hungarian security brigades from the southern
sector to Army Group Center Rear Area. This move did little to restore
matters, however, for some 30 percent of the personnel were untrained
Carpatho-Ukrainians and the remainder second-rate reserves,
the units were poorly equipped, and their indiscriminate looting and
sharp repressive measures quickly turned the natives against them. 126
SS and SD units venturing into the rear areas from the Reichskommissariate
ware sometimes unceremoniously pressed into the fight; the
forced enlistment of several SD intelligence and reconnaissance teams
brought a sharp reaction from Himmler's headquarters. 127 Later several
of the rear area commanders even went to the extreme of taking all
draft age Germans working as civilians in administrative capacities in
the Reichskommissariat and assigning them to alert forces or as leaders
of native units. l28 As a further source of manpower Army Group North
proposed that field training divisions of the Replacement Army be
transferred from the Zone of the Interior to the east where they might
complete their training in more realistic surroundings and at the same
time release security and police forces from static employment for commitment
against the bands. 129
Even in the face of Hitler's pronouncement against the use of indigenous
units, the rear area commanders continued to throw all available
troops, native and German, into the fight against the bands. The performance
of some of the "Centuries," especially Finnish, Estonian, and
Russian, was generally good initially, but poor tactical employment and
logistical support on the part of the security commands gradually began
to impair their efficiency. Clothing, especially shoes, deteriorated during
the bitter winter weather and was not replaced, and this combined with
the lack of food other than the standard German emergency ration and the
equipment necessary for preparing hot meals did much to lower
their morale and operational value. Despite the fact that somewhat the
same conditions were prevalent in all Wehrmacht units at the time, the
indigenous troops felt forgotten and neglected and quickly tended to
125
OKH to Army Group North, 23 Apr 42, in KTB, H. Gr. Nord, 1.IV.-30.IV.42.
75128/9.
126
Bericht 3,.AOK 2, Ic, 30.III.42., An1 331 z. KTB AOK 2, Ic, Band IV, 1.IV.-
30.IV.42. 2361 7/62.
127 Entry for 26 May 42, in KTB, 207 Sich. Div., 1.I.31 .XII.42. 33300/1.
128
Bericht, H. Geb. Nord, 3.VIII.42., in KTB, H. Gr. Nord, 1.VIII.-31 .VIII.42.,
3060. 75128/13.
129
Army Group North to OKH, 10 May 42, in KTB, H. Gr. Nord. l.V.-30.V.42,
p. 1998. 75128/10.