the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

GERMAN-RUSSIAN OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THE FALL OF STALINGRAD 127
These controversies indicated more clearly than at any other time the
differences in thinking between Hitler and his immediate advisers on the
one hand and the majority of the Army commanders on the other. The
latter argued in favor of shortening the line in keeping with German
manpower limitations and conserving armored strength for a mobile
defense, while Hitler steadfastly clung to the rigid policy of holding the
line as far from the Reich as possible.'
Despite the arguments of his ranking Army leaders, Hitler adopted
Zeitzler's views and ordered that the attack, code-named Operation
ZITADELLE, be scheduled for early execution.
The Battle for Kursk and Kharkov
The Russian forces facing the Germans along the eastern front as the
operating season opened in July consisted of some 45 armies organized
into 12 fronts.' To oppose these the Wehrmacht had 161 divisions
organized into 11 armies and 4 army groups. The disparity of strength,
however, was far wider than the number of units would indicate on
paper. Russian strength had been building up steadily while the Germans
remained unable to replace their extremely heavy losses. Battle casualties
alone since the start of the campaign totaled more than 2,500,000 men,
and the German nation simply had not the manpower to replace them.'
Operation ZITADELLE began on 5 July. The plan called for the same
tactics the Germans had used many times before and with which the
Russians were more than familiar. Model was to send his Ninth Army—
seven panzer, two panzergrenadier,'" and nine infantry divisions—
against the northern face of the salient, while Von Manstein attacked
from the south in the vicinity of Belgorod with ten panzer, one
panzergrenadier, and seven infantry divisions. Additional elements of the
Ninth Army were to drive to the southeast to protect Model's left flank,
while Armeeahteilung Kempf covered the right of Von Manstein's effort.
No particular care was taken to conceal the directions of the main efforts,
and as a result the Russians knew what to expect and where.
From the first hours of the attack it was clearly evident that Model and
Guderian had been correct and that the Russians were ready and
7
United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Keitel interrogation report, 27 Jun 45.
Shuster Collection. Foreign Studies Br, OCMH.
8 See : Lage Ost, 5.V11.43.
9
Gefechtsausfaelle Sowjetfeldzug, vorn 22.V1.41. bis 10.V11.43., Der Heeresarzt
b. Obdh/GenQu, Nr. 1/4451/43 g. Kdos., OKH, den 14.V11.43. H 17/189.
Losses to 10 Jul 43 totaled 2,614,039 enlisted men and 75,084 officers killed, wounded,
and missing. This figure does not include medical and accident casualties or satelllite
casualties. Nor does it include the number of convalescents returned to duty.
10 A Panzergrenadier division was made up of armored infantry and motorized infantry
supported by several units of assault guns.