the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIES IN OPERATION 67
they operated in areas with which they were well acquainted and set up
their bases on swamp islands and in deep forests difficult of access. They
made their marches only by night and over prearranged routes. They
were armed with Russian or captured German ordnance, their ammunition
coming from bypassed Soviet depots or raids on German convoys
and installations. Occasionally they received arms, generally automatic,
and ammunition by air drop. They lived off the country, forcibly requisitioning
what they needed from the natives. They deliberately attempted
to demoralize the local civilians with sudden raids, rumormongering,
and general heavy-handed terror tactics. 36 There is some
evidence that they attempted to gather and transmit information on
German troop dispositions and the locations of German supply installations,
and in several instances the Germans were given reason to believe
that Red Army countermoves were made on the basis of partisan-supplied
information. 37
This improvement in the organization and operational capabilities of
the bands did not go unobserved by the Germans. As early as the middle
of September the security commands were aware that the resistance they
faced was not of a passing nature but the opposition of irregular groups
under some sort of a centralized control. They saw the fallacy in their
earlier overconfidence and realized that the antipartisan tactics they
were then using were faulty and that a change of method was called for. 38
Through observation, PW interrogation, and collation of captured documents
they had been able to pinpoint the types of groups they had to
contend with : the annihilation battalions, units of Red Army soldiers led
by Army commissars, local groups comprising predominantly young Communists
who worked on the collective farms during the day and gathered
into previously established units at night to operate against German communications,
and Communist Party members and NKVD personnel
infiltrated or parachuted into the occupied areas on special sabotage
missions or with the task of fomenting rebellion among the natives. 39
Of these the annihilation units appeared to be the backbone of the
movement, furnishing most of the opposition. As the Red Army per-
36
Bhf, H. Geb. Mitte, Nr. 1001/41 geh., 12.X.41., Anl, Bd, II. KTB 1, H. Geb.
Mitte, 1.IX.-31.XII.41. 14681/3; H. Geb. Nord, Ia, Ic/AO, nr. 1198/41
geh., 14 IX.41., Nr. 1236/41 geh., 20.IX.41., Nr. 1328/41 geh., 7.X.41., KTB, H. Geb,
Nord. 14768/4: Lagebericht, Wi Stab Ost, 16.IX.-30.IX.41., Anl. 58 z. KTB, Wi
Stab Ost. Wi/ID 2.345.
37
Meldung 71, Einsatzgruppe, A, 2.IX.41. 62/6; Meldung 97, Einsatzgruppe B.
28.IX.41. 62/5.
38
Korpsbefehl Nr. 52, H. Geb. Mitte, In, 14.IX.41., Anl. 125, Anlagenband II.
KTB I. H. Geb. Mitte, 1.IX.-31.XII.41. 14681/3.
39
Anl. 1 z. AOK 16, Ic/AO, Nr. 52/41. 13.VIII.41., KTB, Korueck 584. 35615/2 ;
H. Geb. Nord. Ia, Ic, Nr. 1198/41 geh., 14.IX.41., KTB, 281 Sich. Div. 15954/2;
ltr, Bfh. Sicherheitspolizei und SD to Bfh. H. Geb. Nord., 14 Aug 41, in KTB, H.
Geb. Nord. 14768/5.