the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

162 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
no evidence of any plan for concerted action. 54 Even the abrupt German
switch to the defensive, which caused a considerable increase in
troop movements through the Bryansk area, brought no untoward response
from the irregulars, the Second Panzer Army reporting only a
few widely spread rail demolitions in its rear. 55
Even further to the rear in the heavy terrain of the Pripyat there was
little change in the sabotage picture from June. For the 20-day period
ending 21 July the 203d Security Division in the area about Bobruysk,
which included the highly vulnerable Minsk-Bobruysk-Gomel line, recorded
a total 101 demolitions which caused damage, 39 which resulted
in no harm to trackage, and 140 charges removed prior to explosion
only a slight increase over the preceding 20 days. 56
By 27 July the Germans realized that the Bryansk-Orel salient was
no longer tenable and passed the order to withdraw to a defense line
just east of the Desna River. Almost coincident with this German
decision the tempo of partisan activity changed abruptly.
On 22 July, bands which had been forced westward out of the forests
south of Bryansk hit very hard at the north-south Bryansk-Konotop line,
which was used primarily for shuttling troops between the central and
southern sectors, and set off demolitions on the tracks at 430 places,
blocking all traffic for 48 hours. In many of these demolitions and those
which followed in the next weeks, they used a small, newly designed
mine set in chains of up to 500 at one demolition site. 57 The same day, a
mine which had been attached to a railroad car detonated in the station
at Osipovichi, on the main line between Minsk and Gomel, blowing up
two ammunition trains and one fuel train as well as a trainload of badly
needed "Tiger" tanks. 58 This increase in sabotage continued the remainder
of the month, totaling 1,114 for the entire month (an average of
36 demolitions per day), and including over 400 raids on targets other
than the rail lines and more than 30 bridges blown in the area of the
203d Security Division alone. 59 Still, despite this increased interference
54
See entries for 4 Jul-13 Jul 43 in Pz AOK 2, Ia. KTB 3, Band 3, I.V1.-13.VIII.
43. 37075/13.
55
Actually the only report of rail demolitions was on 14 July when nine track
breaks were recorded for the preceding 24 hours. See ibid., entry for 14 July.
56
Anlagen 99, 100 z. KTB 203 Sich. Div., 11-3.V111.43., Zehntagebericht.
35950/2. The respective totals for the preceding twenty day period were 75, 55,
and 133. See Anlagen 83, 87 in ibid.
57
Ibid. See also: Hermann Teske, Die Silbernen Spiegel (Heidelberg, 1952),
p. 192; Hermann Teske, "Railroad Transportation Operation ZITADELLE (1943)."
MS # D-369. Foreign Studies Br., OCMH.
58
Hermann Teske, "Railroad Transportation Operation ZITADELLE (1943)."
MS # D-369. Foreign Studies Br., OCMH.
59
Herman Teske, "Railroad Transportation Operation ZITADELLE (1943)."
MS # D-369, Foreign Studies Br., OCMH; Anlagen 99, 100, 101, z. KTB 203 Sich.
Div., 1.I-31.VIII.43., Zehntagebericht. 35950/2; Teske, op. cit., p. 192. Actually
the total of bridges and culverts blown in the 203d Security Division area for the
period 2 July through 3 August totaled 57, with 34 in the last 10-day period. However,
this last period included the mass attacks of the night of 2-3 August and thus only
an estimated fraction of the 38 can be included for July.