the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

THE GERMANS CHANGE THEIR TACTICS 121
with destruction by both sides. In every case where collective measures
were taken, it was of the utmost importance that the people be made to
understand the reasons. Through propaganda media the partisans were
to be informed that as deserters they would be well treated, as prisoners
they would be executed. "A different approach [than heretofore
used]," the directive concluded "must be used toward the population
under partisan oppression." l4
Too Little Too Late
There is much to be said for this change of policy. Militarily it was
sound, based as it was on the sum total of German experience against the
bands. But it was impracticable in that it presupposed manpower which
the Germans simply did not have. Put into practice in the fall of 1941
when the security divisions were full strength rather than mere skeletons,
it might have nipped the movement in the bud. In the fall of 1942
there was little chance for it to work.
The bands were to be hit and hit again with strong offensive strikes.
Yet there was not enough manpower available to give adequate static
coverage to the lines of communication. Security regiments which had
been drawn into the front lines during the winter crisis were not returned
to the rear area commands, 15 while line units which had helped mop up
the rear in the late spring reverted to their parent commands at the conclusion
of their missions. 16 The transfer of six training divisions from
the Wehrkreise to the Reichskommissariate, where they were to assume
some static guard duties while completing their basic training, afforded
some relief and released a few security units for more active employment
in the operations zone. 17 These latter small gains to the security commands,
however, were more than offset by the loss of training time by
the divisions to the ultimate detriment of the armies at the front. All of
them were so stripped of detachments up to regimental size for full-time
antipartisan work that their training was badly disrupted and in several
cases brought to a virtual standstill. 18
Then again, when occasionally a force of sufficient numerical strength
for a limited offensive sweep against the bands could be assembled by
l4
Kampfenweisung fuer die Bandenbekaempfung im Osten, 11.XI.42., Anlage 2 to H. Dv.
Ia., in Anlage f to KTB, Ia, Kdr, Gen. der Sicherungstruppen, Heeresgebiet
Sued. 1943. 39502/45.
15
KTB, H. Gr. Nord. 31.VIII.42: 75138/13.
16 KTB, H. Gr. Nord, 12.1X.42. 75128/14 ; Luge Ost, 20.IX.42.
l7
MS # C065a, op, cit., p. 37; KTB, H. Gr. Nord, 17.IX.42., 18.1X.42.
75128/14; OKW/WFSt., Op. Nr. 2821/42 g. Kdos., F. H. Qu., 18.VIII.42., in
"Fuehrer Directives," op. cit.; Gen. Kdo. LXII. Res. K., Ia. Tgb. Heimat-Russland.
9.IX.42.-31.III.43. 29483; Gen. Kdo. LXI Res. Korps, Tgb., Ia. 14.IX.42.-
31.III.43. 30500/1.
18 Gen. Kdo. LXI Res. Korps, Tgb., la. 14.IX.42.-31.III.43. 30500/1.