the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

GERMAN OPERATIONS TO THE STALINGRAD DEBACLE 37
River. Immediately on achieving this objective, the infantry divisions
of the northern arm of the pincer were to set up strong defensive positions
on the line Livny-Voronezh to anchor the northern flank of the
whole army group. With this wing secure, the armor was to move southward
along the right bank of the river in support of the second attack. In
this second phase, the Sixth Army, now commanded by Generaloberst
Friedrich Paulus, was to strike northeast from Kharkov to link up with
the Fourth Panzer Army along the Don and then swing downriver with
it in support of the third phase, which was to be launched eastward from
the Mius River line by the First Panzer and Seventeenth Armies. These
latter were to join the units sweeping into the Don bend, with one element
swinging tothe south to retake Rostov and secure bridgeheads
over the lower Don in preparation for the final drive to the Caucasus.
The payoff phase was to be the final securing of the long left flank of the
army group as a defensive front with the capture of Stalingrad and the
rapid overrunning of the whole Caucasus region by the First Panzer
and Seventeenth Armies. 17
On 28 June the Fourth Panzer and Second Armies opened the offensive,
sweeping eastward against light opposition. By 4 July the armor
reached the Don at Voronezh and on the 7th established firm contact
with the Sixth Army which had launched its phase of the attack on the
last day of June. Despite this progress, all had not gone according to
plan ; a stubborn defense at Voronezh delayed the armored units' swinging
downriver just long enough for several large Russian forces to evade
the trap and escape to the east.
The third phase of the offensive was opened on 9 July with the combined
Fourth Panzer and Sixth Armies pushing down the Don as planned
and the First Panzer and Seventeenth Armies moving out from their
Mius River line. Fear of the armor being delayed by a strong defense
at Rostov caused a last minute change of plan and the main effort of the
First Panzer Army was made much further to the north and across the
Donets River instead of in the bend closer to Rostov. The First and
Fourth Panzer Armies linked up on the 15th with the former forcing
the Donets and closing on Rostov, and the latter driving steadily to the
south. As the armor moved into the lower reaches of the river, the
Russians withdrew before it, while the Sixth Army forged slowly into
the Don bend opposite Stalingrad. By the 22nd the First Panzer Army
reached Rostov, holding four bridgeheads over the Don, and the Fourth
Panzer Army secured a crossing furtherto the east.
Meanwhile, on 8 May, Von Manstein opened operations with his
Eleventh Army to sweep the Crimea as a prerequisite to the drive to the
Caucasus. He first turned his attention to the Russians in the eastern
end of the peninsula and by 2 June was able to focus his efforts on the
17 Ibid.