the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

66 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
Possibly as a result of this move, or at least coincident with it, the bands
began to increase their activity. Although they were still far from being
tight-knit military units and their liaison with Moscow and with each
other was exceedingly tenuous when it existed at all, their operations
started showing some semblance of order and purpose. In some cases
their discipline was much improved and in portions of the central sector
they followed Moscow-issued directives in both training and operations. 32
Some with radios had some limited success in establishing liaison with
the Red Army units opposite the German divisions in whose rear they
were working. 33 A few received leaders who had been trained at special
partisan schools in the Soviet rear. 34
Change in German Tactics
Having found that they could not operate successfully except in terrain
which protected their movements and bases and made German
counteraction difficult, and not being particularly aggressive in any
case, the partisan bands that were not broken up by the Germans or did
not melt away from their own lack of organization and discipline began
concentrating in the heavy forests and swamp areas, the Pripyat Marshes,
the wooded regions of White Russia, and the almost trackless area south
of Lake Ilmen behind the Sixteenth Army. This made the organization
tasks of the Central Staff much easier and at the same time presaged
grouping into larger units and future operations on more than a hitand-run
scale. Even during October the demolitions in these areas
were increasing, and behind the right wing of Army Group North the
number of bands visibly multiplied to such an extent that the armycommander
there was forced to assign areas for partisan control to his
combat divisions. 35
The tactics of the bands appeared to keep pace with these forward steps
in organization and discipline. They seldom launched a raid without
previous reconnaissance, often carried out by civilians pressured into the
job, and generally struck or failed to strike in relation to the number of
German troops in the area. They never remained in a district in the
face of strong opposition and made every effort to avoid a standup fight.
Forced from a particular sector by aggressive German action, they
subsequently began raiding in another less well protected. In general
32
Meldung 71, Einsatzgruppe A, 2.1X.41. 62/6.
33
Ibid.; Meldung 97, Eitzsatzgruppe B, 28.1X.41. 62/5.
34
Wi. Inspektion AOK 6, 2.XI.41. Wi/ID 2.294; Bericht, Bfh. H. Geb. Sued.
29.IX.-30.1X.41.; 5.XI 41. 16407/18.
35
Bericht, Ia, H. Geb. Nord. Nr. 1424/41. 2.XI.41. 14768/4; "Protection of
Troops Against Partisans and Sabotage," 12 Inf. Div., Nr. 60-1/41) 17 Nov 41 in
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, op. cit. VII, pp. 49-51 ; Gen. d. Inf. Walther von
Unruh, CG, Fourth Army Rear Area, "War Experiences in Russia." MS D-056.
OCMH, Foreign Studies Br.