the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

THE PARTISANS AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1943 175
The Pressure Eases Momentarily
During the latter half of October the security commands, by literally
scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel and by abandoning the
protection of several roads and population centers and the construction
of one section of railroad,115 were able to mount several medium-scale
antipartisan operations, thus causing a noticeable drop in sabotage before
the first of November.116 A sharp decrease in airborne supply from the
Soviet rear was also a material factor in this drop, flights shrinking from
the high of more than 2,000 for the first two weeks of May to 315 for
the last two weeks of October. 117
Also affecting the volume of raids and sabotage during this period
was the need for the bands to stockpile food supplies for the coming
winter. With their numbers constantly increasing, they more and more
were forced to turn their energies to extensive foraging and looting of
civilian stores. Too often mindful only of their own requirements, they
indiscriminately struck in any locality where food was to be had, irrespective
of the political sentiments of the inhabitants, seizing quantities
of grain and large numbers of cattle, sometimes as many as 200 in a
single raid. 118
The looting finally assumed such proportions and created such ill
feeling among the natives against both the bands and the Soviet high
command that the Central Staff issued a directive that food could be
requisitioned only in daylight and then through negotiation with the
village elders, and that all taken was to be signed for. Pillaging and
foraging at night were forbidden and all caught so doing were ordered
to be shot. 119
Despite the cut in air supply, Moscow made it clear that the bands
were in no wise being abandoned and showed itself both willing and
able to aid them when the occasion demanded. During October one
German antipartisan unit succeeded in isolating the 2,500-man Polk
Grischin in the Pripyat Marshes behind the Ninth Army. This Polk
115
H. Gr. Mitte, la, Nr. 13097/43 g. Kdos., Bandenlage, Okt. 43, Anl. z.
KTB, H. Gr. Mitte, Fuehrungsabt., Akte XXIII, Heft 12, 1.X.-31.XII.43.
65002/24.
116 Monalsbericht, Okt. 43, Korueck 580, Ic, Nr. 4307/43 geh., 28.X.43., KTB
28a, Korueck 580, 16.X.-31.X.43. 41217/2; Bericht, Okt. 43, AOK 2, Ia. Bandenbekaempfung
IV, 1.X1.43.-301.44., 52701/107; see also: Bandenlage ins Bereich
der H. Gr. Mitte, Stand: 30.IX.43., Anl. z. KTB H. Gr. Mitte. 65002/24.
117
See: Anl. 4 z. Bandenlage inn Osten, Anlagen. H 3/749; Feindeinfluege vom
1.X.-15.X.43.,H. Gr. Mitte, Ia. Nr. 13097/43 g. Kdos., Anl. 4.5 z. KTB, H. Gr.
Mitte. 65002/24.
118 Monatsbericht, Okt. 43, Korueck 559, Ic. Nr. 4424/43 geh., Heft 3, Anl. 1-17
z. KTB, Ic. Korueck 559, 5.VII.-28.XII.43. 45668/4.
119 Bandenlage, Okt. 43, im Bereich des Korueck 585, AO. z. KTB, Korueck 585,
11.X.-1.XII.43. 44172/4; captured partisan directive, An!. z. KTB, H. Gr. Mitte,
Bandenmeldungen, Nov. 43–Maetz 44. 65002/69,