the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

CHAPTER 7
THE GERMANS CHANGE THEIR TACTICS
During the winter and spring months there had been no question in
the minds of the Army of the most effective way to deal with the partisan
groups and eliminate them permanently. The proper tactic, as they
saw it, was an active offense by sufficient first-line troops to carry the
fight to them in their own strongholds, destroy their camps and bases,
and never relax the pressure long enough to allow them to reconstitute.
And they had to be denied the passive as well as the active support
of the people. A strictly passive defense with garrisons, outposts, and
patrols was not the answer, they knew, for such would leave the initiative
with the insurgents and play directly into their hands. 1
In the spring OKH had made a sound move toward pulling the
natives away from the partisans when it modified the then standard
practice of using reprisals and collective punitive measures to prevent
the people from aiding or joining the bands. Then in August, in the
more active sphere, it went a long way toward placing all aspects of
the antipartisan campaign on a firmer and more centralized military
basis when it announced that thereafter all actions against the insurgents
would be onducted like normal combat operations at the front, with
the operations section of OKH determining the general policy and handling
all coordination, and similar questions at lower echelon levels
being handled by the operations section of the headquarters concerned. 2
The New OKW Antipartisan Policy
During the days just prior to the launching of the attack toward the
Caucasus in June of 1942, Hitler himself, for the first time in months,
had begun to show a renewed interest in the Soviet partisans. Both in
Russia and in the Balkans irregular resistance had been increasing,
and with the opening of the summer campaign drawing near he iterated
his "get tough" prescription as the surest means of ridding the rear
areas of all insurgent threats and securing communications. 3
1
Report on Effects of the Partisan Situation," 30 Jun 43.Wi/ID 2.53; entry
for 4 NOV42 in KTB 2. Teil 2, Pr AOK 2. 28499/5; Bandenlage, 16.VIII.42.-
28.11.43., Anl.77 z.KTB, la, Pr AOK 2. 37075/90.
2
See: H. Gr. Mitte, la, Partisanenbekaempfung, 10.VIII.42., Anl. z. KTB, la,
Pz AOK 2. 37075/91. a
3
KTB, Ob. d. Wehrmacht, I .IV.-30.VI.42. X--126. OCMH, Foreign Studies Br.
116