the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

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THE PARTISANS AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1943 179 and above their static guard commitments. At night native scouts were widely employed, but with limited success. 131 The need for such innovations was clearly emphasized when in late November the continued Red Army pressure on the flanks of the sector and a newly opened assault on Orsha forced Army Group Center to draw off more and more units from the security commands for service at the front. The quieter portions of the rear were especially hard hit in this respect. The Fourth Army Rear Area, where the bands were less active for the moment, lost a total of 4,366 men, all Germans and all combat troops, to army and corps units during November alone. 132 Accentuating this was the loss to security command control of the SS and police battalions originally committed in Operation HEINRICH. Before the end of the month the situation became so bad that Army Group Center advised OKH that it could mount no antipartisan operations until the situation at the front warranted returning these troops to their parent commands or they were replaced from the Zone of the Interior. 133 The indigenous units which had been recruited to replace those transferred to France were of little help in this situation. Although they were proving more reliable than their predecessors, due, so the Germans believed, to the Wehrmacht success in the defensive battles, they still could not be trusted on other than the most routine security assignments in quiet areas. 134 The Long-Range Partisan Strategy Although during the last weeks of the year the bands continued their raids on the roads and railroads and especially on the telephone and cable lines, the attacks lacked cohesion, and on the whole they appeared more intent on expanding and consolidating their areas of concentration than disrupting The German supply axes. In the country paralleling these axes, they worked steadily at forming continuous, solid areas where they might completely dominate every phase of the situation; they no longer conformed their dispositions to billeting and forage possibilities or to the proximity of other hands. More and more their primary aim seemed to be a strategic redistribution of their centers of strength. This became so marked before the end of the year that the Germans believed they were subordinating all activity to preparations for a coordinated attack on 131 H. Gr. Mitte, Ia, Nr. 14550/43 g. Kdos., 8.XII.43., Anl. z. KTB, H. Gr. Mitte, Fuehrungsabt., Akte XXIII, Heft 12, 1.X.-31.XII.43. 65002/24. MS # P-132, "Signal Communications in the East," pp. 219-20. Foreign Studies Br., OCMH; Bericht, Koruleck 559, Ia. Nr. 5216/43 geh., KTB, Korueck 559, Ia, 5.X1. –30.XII.43. 45668/3. 132 Bericht, Korueck 559, Ia. Nr. 5216/43 geh., KTB, Korueck 559. Ia, 5.X1.– 30.XII.43. 45668/3. 133 H. Gr. Mitte, Ia. Nr. 14550/43 g. Kdos., 8.XII.43., Ant. z. KTB, 11. Gr. Mitte, Fuehrungsabt., Aktc XXIII, Heft 12, 1.X.-31.XII.43. 65002/24. 134 Korueck 559, Ia. Nr. 5216/43 geh. 29.XI.43., Benicia, Korueck 559, Ia. Nr. 5216/43 geh., KTB, Korueck 559, Ia. 5.X1.-30.XII.43. 45668/3.
180 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT German communications and routes of withdrawal in support of a general Red Army offensive. 135 The bands lacked neither the manpower nor the popular support to execute this mission. As of 1 January 1944 the number of men in bands in the central sector that had been identified by the Germans was slightly in excess of 140,000, 136 nor was there any dearth of fillers for the expanding ranks. With the critical nature of the German situation an established fact, the natives flocked to them in such numbers that all could not he armed and many had to be sluiced eastward through gaps in the front for duty with the Red Army. 137 In like manner the Soviets extended their political control. As the partisans consolidated their hold on the countryside, the Communist Party advanced side by side with them, conforming closely to their lateral administrative organization and establishing itself in such a manner as to be able to throw its whole weight into the fight when needed. 138 135 Korueck 559, Ic. Tgb. Nr. 5899/43 geh., 28.XII.43., Heft 3, Ant. 1-17, Ic. z. KTB Korueck 559/Ia. 5.VII.-28.XII.43. 45668/4; Korueck 559/Ia. Nr. 5891/43 geh., 30.XII.43., Heft 2, Anl. 94-126 z. KTB Korueck 559/Ia. 5.X1.-30.XII.43. 45668/3; Meldung, Dez. 43, 3.1.44., AOK 2, Ia. Bandenbekaempfung IV, 1.XI.43.– 30.1.44. 52701/107; H. Gr. Mitte, la, Nr. 279/44 g. Kdos., 8.1.44., Anl. z. KTB H. Gr. Mitte, Akte XXII, Heft 13, 1.1.-31.111.44. 65002/48; H. Gr. Mitte, Ic/AO (Abw.) Nr. 63/44 geh., 3.1.44., Ant. z. KTB, H. Gr. Mitte, Bandenmeldungen, Nov 43–Mar 44. 65002/69. 136 Bandenlage in, Bereich der H. Gr. Mitte, Stand: 1.1.44., Bandenlisten, H. Gr. Mitte, Ic/AO (Abw.), Sept.–Dez. 43. 65003/5. 137 Ibid.; H. Gr. Mitte, la, Nr. 279/44 g. Kdos., 8.1.44., Ant. z. KTB II. Gr. Mitte, Akte XXII, Heft 13, 1.1.-31.111.44. 65002/48. 138 H. Gr. Mitte, Ic/AO (Abw.), Nr. 63/44 geh., 3.1.44., Anl. z. KTB, H. Gr. Mitte, Bandenmeldungen, Nov 43–Mar 44. 65002/69; "Nachrichten veber Bandenkrieg Nr. 6," OKH GenStr111. Fde H. Ost. H 3/738.
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F I N L A N D Kholrn MOSCOW S. R. A
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON 2
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PREFACE The purpose of this text is
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viii PART TWO . 1941-1942: THE PERI
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x PART THREE. 1943-1944: THE PERIOD
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2 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT Euro
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4 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT Whit
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6 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT mile
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Map 3. Period of German Offensives,
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PREINVASION PLANNING 9 Still doubti
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PREINVASION PLANNING 11 Chart 1 - O
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PREINVASION PLANNING 13 visions wer
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PREINVASION PLANNING 15 limited obj
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PREINVASION PLANNING 17 and philoso
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PREINVASION PLANNING 19 district Ko
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PREINVASION PLANNING 21 torates, on
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PREINVASION PLANNING 23 world revol
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PREINVASION PLANNING 25 sions, of w
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GERMAN OPERATIONS TO THE STALINGRAD
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EARLY RUSSIAN RESISTANCE AND GERMAN
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CHAPTER 5 GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIE
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GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIES IN OPERA
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Chapter 6 THE OCCUPATION FALTERS
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 99 The commo
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 101 lective
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 103 Religion
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 105 was the
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 107 The Forc
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 109 As the p
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 111 This gro
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 113 . The Pa
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 115 tected b
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THE GERMANS CHANGE THEIR TACTICS 11
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F N L A N O Map 4. Period of Soviet
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