the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

GERMAN-RUSSIAN OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THE FALL OF STALINGRAD
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the Wehrmacht generally back where it had started in June. In addition,
the Germans had been forced out of the Rzhev-Vyazma salient which
threatened Moscow, and the Red Army had been able to drive and hold a
deep position in the Kursk area which threatened to sever
communications between the southern and central groups of armies.
These reverses, resulting as they did in huge and irreplaceable losses in
men and materiel, combined with the defeat in Tunisia, brought an end to
the period of sustained German offensives.
The Red Army in 1943
The Soviet Army which faced the Germans in the summer of 1943
had little in common with the hordes who had fled in confusion before
the Wehrmacht in the first months of the war. Reorganized throughout, it
had a paper strength of some 500 divisions, a good number of which
were well equipped with modern weapons. The high command had
carefully studied the reverses of 1941 and 1942 and assimilated the
lessons, as the careful preparations and well-directed execution of the
November counterblow at Stalingrad demonstrated. New combat
regulations had been drawn up, military discipline had been tightened ;
insignia of rank had reappeared on Red Army uniforms; and the power of
the political commissars had been curtailed, the military becoming
wholly responsible for operations. Ample supplies of new weapons were
coming off the production lines of plants relocated far to the cast in the
Ural Mountains, and lend-lease from the United States and Britain was
beginning to make itself felt. Even more important was the improvement
of morale among the common soldiers. The collapse of the myth of
Wehrmacht invincibility combined with the revival of the past glories of
Russian arms and a hate of the enemy engendered by the inept German
occupation policy and treatment of prisoners of war went far toward
making a new fighting man of the Red soldier.
German Strategy in 1943
Compared with former years, Hitler's strategic plan for the summer
campaign of 1943 was anything but optimistic and, for once, indicated
an awareness of the adverse state, of German affairs in the east. His
former buoyant aggressiveness was completely lacking and for the first
time he talked in terms of a general defensive. He expected the Red
Army to continue its heavy attacks at the close of the muddy season and
reasoned that if he were to dictate Soviet actions anywhere he had to take
the initiative at several points along the front before the Russians struck.
The point of greatest danger, according to his reasoning, and the spot at
which the Wehrmacht should strike before the Red Army resumed its
offensive was the deep salient in the Kursk area which lay like a sore