the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIES IN OPERATION 69
A better clearing house for the assembly and collation of information on
the partisans was to be set up; complete reports of all partisan actions
and countermeasures taken were to be submitted and detailed interrogations
of all prisoners forwarded to higher headquarters in order that
experience gained might be used in future operations. 41
The New Tactics in Operation
The application of these new approaches to the partisan question
was fairly universal throughout the three army group sectors. Additional
measures were taken by individual units. The Army Group Center
Rear Area revamped its procedure for guarding rail lines: a battalion
of security troops was assigned to every 60 miles of track, two men to
each half-mile. The remainder of the battalion was to be used on patrol
duty or held as a reserve. All bridges were to have a sentry at both
ends with an additional guard underneath at night. patrols were to
constantly check rail connections and the inside-of tracks for mines.
A similar procedure was ordered for the express highways. 42
The armies themselves experienced no opposition from the partisans
in the immediate combat zone other than scattered attacks on single
vehicles, 43 yet they seemed fully aware of the possible effect of such
action on their supply and took steps accordingly. The Ninth Army
was particularly specific. In the combat area each corps was made
responsible for security and control d the population in its sector. Patrols
were ordered out to round up all village leaders and males not originally
from the area. Mayors appointed by the corps were to be made responsible
for registering all strangers. Passes and identification cards issued
by any agency outside the jurisdiction of the army were declared invalid,
and in the army area no pass was to have any value nor were any to
be issued. Any partisans-captured before 15 September were to be
accorded prisoner of war status. Interrogation of partisan prisoners
was to be comprehensive, covering data on irregular organization, intelligence
system, and missions. Those persuaded to talk were to be forwarded
to corps headquarters for further interrogation. 44 The commandant
of the army rear area was considered responsible for all matters
pertaining to partisan resistance and German countermeasures. If he
became unable to control the situation, the army would take over. 45
41
Dir, Bfh, H. Geb. Nord, Ia/Ic, Nr. 1198/41 geh., 14.IX.41., KTB, 281 Sich.
Div. 15954/2; H. Geb. Sued. Ia/Ic, Nr. 1337/41 geh., 24.VIII.41., KTB, H. Geb.
Sued, Aug 41-Dez 42, 75905; Korpsbefehl Nr. 52, Bfh, H. Geb. Mitte, 14.IX.41.
Anl. 121, Anlagenband II, KTB I. H. Geb. Mitte, 1.IX.-31.XII.41. 14684/3.
42
Anl. 144 z. KTB 1, H. Geb. Mitte, 12.X.41. 14684/3.
43
On this, see: Bericht N. 264/41 geh., 3.IX.41., Geheims Feldpolizei Gruppe
580, KTB, AOK 9. 14162/7.
44
AOK 9, Ic/Abw/OQu, Nr. 238/41 geh., Anl. z. KTB, AOK 9, Ic, 2.III.-
26.XI.41. 14162/7.
45
Befehl, AOK 9, Ia/Ic/Ao. Nr. 254/41 geh., 10.IX.41. 14162/7.